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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three essays in Economics. The first essay concerns the
di↵erence in the business cycle volatility of the unemployment rates of high-skill and
low-skill workers. I show that from the late 1990s onwards the business cycle volatility of
the unemployment rate has been higher for high-skill workers in the United States and
thirteen European Union countries. I address this volatility gap with a business cycle
model in which firms value skill diversity, each worker supplies a specific variety of skill,
and households pay a cost to search and find new jobs. I calibrate the model to United
States data and show it can successfully replicate the observed unemployment volatility
gap, as well as generate unemployment rates that are substantially more volatile than
output.
The second paper modifies a standard two-country international business cycle model
to allow for a state-dependent risk aversion parameter, and investigates whether key
mismatches between the theory and the data can be explained by varying risk aversion. I
show that even though the dynamics of the exchange rate are linked with the behavior of
the risk aversion parameter, under a reasonable calibration the volatility of the exchange
rate is largely una↵ected by how strongly countercyclical risk aversion is. In contrast, I
find that the correlation between the movements in the exchange rate and the movements
in the consumption ratio is substantially reduced in the presence of countercyclical risk
aversion. I show that these results hold under di↵erent assumptions about the behavior
of the risk aversion parameter, and under di↵erent assumptions about the household’s
preferences over the consumption-leisure bundle.
The third essay investigates the relationship between risk taking propensity and economic
and health expectations using data from a longitudinal survey conducted in the Tshwane
Municipality, South Africa. I find evidence that economic expectations significantly predict
risk taking propensity, with better expectations being associated with higher willingness to
take risks. The results hold with two di↵erent measurement scales for risk attitudes, and
hold under a variety of robustness checks. I find some evidence that health expectations
predict risk taking propensity, but the robustness checks fail to confirm the results. The
findings highlight a channel through which economic expectations can a↵ect decision
making under risk, and I discuss its potential implications for entrepreneurial activity and
our understanding of asset bubbles.
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Resumo
A presente tese reu´ne treˆs ensaios na a´rea cient´ıfica da Economia. O primeiro ensaio
relaciona-se com a tema´tica da volatilidade das taxas de desemprego dos trabalhadores
qualificados e na˜o qualificados. Apresenta-se evideˆncia emp´ırica de que, a partir do final
dos anos 90, a volatilidade da taxa de desemprego nos Estados Unidos e em treze pa´ıses
europeus e´ superior para os trabalhadores qualificados. Este diferencial de volatilidade e´
analisado no aˆmbito de um modelo de ciclos de nego´cios reais em que as empresas valorizam
a diversidade de qualificac¸o˜es, cada trabalhador oferece uma qualificac¸a˜o u´nica e as famı´lias
suportam os custos de procura de novos empregos. Uma calibrac¸a˜o do modelo para os
Estados Unidos replica o diferencial de volatilidade observado nos dados, bem como a
maior volatilidade da taxa de desemprego face ao produto.
O segundo ensaio apresenta uma extensa˜o do modelo de ciclos de nego´cios internacionais
com duas economias, a qual contempla famı´lias com aversa˜o ao risco varia´vel, investigando-
se o efeito desta modificac¸a˜o sobre discrepaˆncias existentes entre o modelo e os dados. Os
resultados demonstram que embora a dinaˆmica da taxa de caˆmbio esteja relacionada com
a aversa˜o ao risco, uma calibrac¸a˜o plaus´ıvel deste modelo na˜o modifica substancialmente a
volatilidade da taxa de caˆmbio face ao modelo padra˜o, mantendo-se esta substancialmente
abaixo do que e´ observado nos dados. Em contraste, os resultados demonstram que a
correlac¸a˜o entre os movimentos da taxa de caˆmbio e os movimentos do ra´cio do consumo
e´ menor na presenc¸a de aversa˜o ao risco contra-c´ıclica, reduzindo substancialmente o
diferencial entre o modelo e os dados. A ana´lise de robustez mostra que estes resultados
se verificam com diferentes especificac¸o˜es para as prefereˆncias das famı´lias e para o
comportamento do paraˆmetro de aversa˜o ao risco.
O terceiro ensaio investiga a relac¸a˜o entre a aversa˜o ao risco e as expectativas que os
indiv´ıduos formam sobre a economia e sobre o seu pro´prio estado de sau´de, usando para o
efeito dados longitudinais provenientes de um inque´rito realizado no munic´ıpio de Tshwane,
na A´frica do Sul. Apresenta-se evideˆncia de que as expectativas econo´micas constituem um
previsor estatisticamente significativo da aversa˜o ao risco, estando melhores expectativas
associadas a uma menor aversa˜o ao risco. Estes resultados verificam-se em duas escalas
usadas para medir a aversa˜o ao risco e sa˜o confirmados por uma variedade de testes
de robustez. A evideˆncia sugere que as expectativas sobre o pro´prio estado de sau´de
podem constituir um previsor da aversa˜o ao risco, mas este resultado na˜o e´ confirmado sob
diferentes testes de robustez. Este ensaio realc¸a um canal atrave´s do qual as expectativas
econo´micas podem influenciar a tomada de decisa˜o em contexto de risco, discutindo-se
tambe´m as suas potenciais implicac¸o˜es para a actividade empreendedora e para a formac¸a˜o
de bolhas especulativas.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is a collection of essays on three di↵erent topics in Economics: unem-
ployment, open economy macroeconomics, and risk attitudes. In the first essay,
titled “Di↵erences in the cyclical behavior of high-skill and low-skill unemployment”,
I examine di↵erences in the business cycle volatility of the unemployment rates of
high-skill and low-skill workers. I begin by presenting evidence that from the late
1990s onwards the unemployment rate has been more volatile for high-skill workers
than for low-skill workers in the United States and thirteen E.U. countries. For the
United States, I present additional evidence suggesting that before the mid-1980s
the business cycle volatility of the unemployment rates was instead higher for low-
skill workers. I then introduce a new framework to model unemployment into a
business cycle model with worker heterogeneity, and I use this setup to address the
unemployment volatility di↵erences observed in the data.
In the model, households are composed by a continuum of high-skill and low-skill
workers who o↵er specific skill varieties in the labor market, and the household
derives monopolistic profits from each skill variety that is employed. In contrast
with the traditional search and matching model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
households bear the costs of searching and finding new jobs, and in equilibrium they
balance those costs with the gains associated with expanding the number of skill
varieties that are employed. On the production side, the model features firms that
exhibit a “taste for variety” in their labor inputs: the productivity of labor increases
when a larger set of skill varieties is used. The intuition is that as the number of
workers with di↵erentiated skills increases, so does the scope for specialization gains.
A calibration of this model replicates two key features of the post mid-1980s U.S. data:
(i) the simulations yield unemployment rates that are more volatile for high-skill
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workers than for low-skill workers; and (ii) the simulations yield unemployment rates
that are substantially more volatile than output. However, the model cannot easily
account for the patterns of volatility in the U.S. unemployment rates prior to the
mid-1980s: after accounting for di↵erences in other features of the labor market such
as the relative supply of high-skill workers and the average unemployment rates, the
model still yields higher volatility for the unemployment rate of high-skill workers,
in contrast with the data. I show that while the fit between the model and the data
can be improved by a calibration in which the parameter that governs the “taste
for variety” varies across periods, the mismatch relative to the period before the
mid-1980s persists.
In the second essay, titled “Countercyclical risk aversion in a two-country interna-
tional business cycle model”, I develop an extension of the standard two-country
business cycle model (Backus et al., 1994) in which risk aversion is allowed to fluctuate
in response to economic conditions, and I examine whether this modification changes
key mismatches that exist between the theory and the data. In the model, I use
recursive preferences (Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Epstein and Zin, 1989) to disentangle
risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which is kept fixed,
and assume that risk attitudes shift in response to output fluctuations. In line
with evidence from the literature (e.g., Beber and Brandt, 2006; Guiso et al., 2013;
Ho↵mann et al., 2013; Cohn et al., 2015) I assume that during periods of economic
expansion risk aversion decreases below its baseline level, and during periods of
economic contraction risk aversion increases above its baseline level.
In the standard two-country model, the exchange rate and the Home-Foreign con-
sumption ratio are perfectly correlated, but in the data the correlation is typically
close to zero or negative. This mismatch, known as the Backus and Smith (1993)
puzzle, is substantially reduced in the model with countercyclical risk aversion, as the
simulated correlation between the exchange rate and the consumption rate is close
to 0.5. On the other hand, introducing countercyclical risk aversion in the model
has no substantial e↵ect on another mismatch known as the “quantity anomaly”
(Backus et al., 1995). In the standard two-country model the simulated cross-country
correlation of consumption is larger than the cross-country correlation of output,
whereas in the data the correlations are stronger for output than for consumption.
The extension presented here exhibits the same mismatch, with the cross-country
correlation of consumption being about five times larger than the cross-country
correlation of output.
I show that these results hold under di↵erent specifications for the law of motion of
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risk aversion that include either a richer lag structure, or an asymmetric response
of risk aversion to economic expansions and economic contractions. I also analyze
how the results fare beyond the Cobb-Douglas utility kernel used in the standard
two-country model, and find that using a GHH utility kernel (Greenwood et al.,
1988) yields some improvement to the results.
In the third essay, titled “Expectations and risk attitudes: Evidence from a longitudinal
survey in Tshwane, South Africa”, I use longitudinal data from a large-scale survey
conducted in the Tshwane Municipality, South Africa, to examine how risk attitudes
relate to economic and health expectations. Economists and psychologists have
devoted a substantial amount of research to understanding the determinants of risk
aversion, examining the e↵ects of sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., Dohmen
et al., 2011), genetic factors (e.g., Cesarini et al., 2009; Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009),
exposure to natural disasters (e.g., Eckel et al., 2009; Page et al., 2014; Cameron
and Shah, 2015) or economic shocks (see, e.g., Malmendier and Nagel, 2011), but
the e↵ects associated with expectations remain relatively unexplored.
I investigate how risk attitudes respond to two types of expectations relevant to the
respondents of the survey: (i) economic expectations, which are relevant because
people in the sample face a paucity of wage work and often resort to running small
businesses to earn an income; and (ii) expectations that respondents have about their
own health, which are relevant because people in the sample face a large variance in
disease prevalence, including HIV, with varying current and future consequences. On
fixed-e↵ects regressions that control for a set of sociodemographic characteristics, I
find that both types of expectations significantly predict the willingness to take risks,
with better expectations being associated with a higher willingness to take risks. In
a series of robustness checks that look into issues related to the measurement of risk
attitudes, survey attrition, and autocorrelated disturbances I find that the results
regarding economic expectations hold, but the results regarding health expectations
do not.
The results presented in this essay provide three contributions to the literature. First,
they expand the body of evidence related to the determinants of risk attitudes, not
only with respect to the e↵ects of expectations, but also with respect to the e↵ects of
sociodemographic characteristics, replicating previous findings related to age, marital
status and life satisfaction. Second, the results about expectations feed into the
debate about the stability of risk attitudes over time, contributing evidence that
is compatible with recent studies which suggest that risk preferences may have a
time-varying component (Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011;
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Cohn et al., 2015). Finally, the results are also relevant for policymakers because
they highlight how decision making under risk may be a↵ected by policies that shift
people’s expectations.
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Chapter 2
Di↵erences in the cyclical behavior
of high-skill and low-skill
unemployment
2.1 Introduction
Labor market outcomes for high-skill workers and low-skill workers di↵er greatly. On
average, high-skill workers earn higher wages and face lower unemployment rates
than low-skill workers do. A substantial amount of research in economics has been
devoted to the study of the aforementioned wage di↵erence, and there is now an
extensive literature that examines the behavior of the skill premium (see, e.g., Katz
and Murphy, 1992; Acemoglu, 2003; Lindquist, 2004; Autor et al., 2008; Heathcote
et al., 2010). Similarly, di↵erences between the unemployment rates of high-skill
and low-skill workers have motivated a vast literature in economics. Some studies
present evidence of how unemployment is less prevalent among high-skill workers
than among low-skill workers (see, e.g., Mincer, 1991; Topel, 1993; Manacorda and
Petrongolo, 1999), and other studies show that the gap between the unemployment
rates of the two groups has widened over time (see, e.g., Murphy and Topel, 1987;
Nickell and Bell, 1996). But along the business cycle the labor market outcomes for
high-skill and low-skill workers are also di↵erent in terms of the volatility of their
unemployment.
In Table 2.1 we present evidence of a volatility gap in the cyclical component of
the unemployment rates of high-skill and low-skill workers in the United States
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Table 2.1: Cyclical volatility of the unemployment rate in the
United States and thirteen E.U. countries, by skill group
Country Period
Low-skill
workers
High-skill
workers
Ratio
high-
low
Austria 1999:Q1–2016:Q4 8.45 17.39 2.06
Belgium 1999:Q1–2016:Q4 7.73 10.53 1.36
Bulgaria 2000:Q1–2016:Q4 13.51 17.46 1.29
Czech Republic 1998:Q1–2016:Q4 12.18 14.03 1.15
Finland 2000:Q1– 2016:Q4 7.34 8.45 1.15
France 2003:Q1– 2016:Q4 5.06 6.91 1.36
Germany 2005:Q1– 2016:Q4 4.26 6.40 1.50
Hungary 1999:Q1– 2016:Q4 6.59 10.72 1.63
Ireland 2000:Q1–2016:Q4 13.27 14.79 1.11
Italy 2001:Q1–2016:Q4 6.43 8.37 1.30
Luxembourg 2003:Q1–2016:Q4 13.88 20.39 1.47
Portugal 1998:Q1–2016:Q4 9.74 12.92 1.33
United Kingdom 2000:Q1–2016:Q4 6.74 8.61 1.28
United States 1998:Q1–2016:Q4 13.11 15.84 1.21
Notes: The statistics reported are standard deviations (in percent). Data are log-transformed
quarterly unemployment rates, presented as deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend with
the smoothing parameter set to 1600. Data for the United States are obtained from monthly series
of the Current Population Survey, and data for the E.U. countries are from the European Union
Labor Force Survey. See the text for additional details.
and thirteen European Union countries. The data are seasonally adjusted quarterly
log unemployment rates, presented as deviations from an Hodrick-Prescott filtered
trend with the smoothing parameter set to 1600.1 For the United States the data
are computed from monthly series of the Current Population Survey, and for the
E.U. countries the data are from the European Union Labor Force Survey. In all
countries the data refers to individuals aged between 20 and 64 years old, which we
categorize as high-skill workers if the data indicates they have completed at least
4 years of college education (U.S. data) or tertiary education (E.U. data), and as
low-skill workers otherwise. The samples for the E.U. countries are dictated by data
availability; the sample for the United States begins at the earliest year for which
there is data available for the E.U. countries. We can see that in some cases – like in
the Czech Republic, Finland, and Ireland – the standard deviation of the detrended
log unemployment rate is around 10% to 15% larger for high-skill workers than
for low-skill workers. In other cases – like in Austria, Germany or Hungary – the
di↵erence is much more substantial, with the standard deviation of the detrended
log unemployment rate being at least 50% larger for high-skill workers. Across all
1We present results obtained from data on unemployment rates, but there is no meaningful
di↵erence if we use data on unemployment levels.
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Table 2.2: Cyclical volatility of the unemployment rate in the
United States, by skill group
Period
Low-skill
workers
High-skill
workers
Ratio
high-low
1976:Q1–2016:Q4 11.80 12.94 1.10
1976:Q1–1983:Q4 14.57 12.55 0.86
1984:Q1–2016:Q4 11.03 13.05 1.18
Notes: The statistics reported are standard deviations (in percent). Data are log-transformed
quarterly unemployment rates, presented as deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend
with the smoothing parameter set to 1600. Data are obtained from monthly series of the Current
Population Survey. See the text for additional details.
countries, the business cycle volatility of the unemployment rate is on average 37%
higher for high-skill workers than for low-skill workers, and a Wilcoxon signed-rank
test shows that the di↵erence is statistically significant at the 1% level (z =  3.296,
p = 0.001).2
For the United States the availability of data allows us to extend our analysis to
a longer period of time, and in Table 2.2 we present additional evidence regarding
the volatility gap in the detrended log unemployment rates of low-skill and high-
skill workers. Over the period 1976:Q1–2016:Q4, the standard deviation of the
unemployment rate is 10% larger for high-skill workers than for low-skill workers, a
gap which is smaller than the 21% gap observed over the period 1998:Q1–2016:Q4.
This suggests that the unemployment volatility gap in the United States experienced
a change some time between the first quarter of 1976 and the last quarter of 2016.
This is perhaps unsurprising, as the literature documents several instances of volatility
shifts in time series of the United States economy during the mid-1980s. For example,
Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) provide evidence
that points to a decline in the volatility of the growth rate of the U.S. GDP after the
first quarter of 1984. Stock and Watson (2002) present evidence of similar declines
in several other time series of the United States economy. More recently, Castro
and Coen-Pirani (2008) document a threefold increase in the cyclical volatility of
skilled hours relative to the cyclical volatility of GDP in the United States since
1984, and Champagne and Kurmann (2013) show that the business cycle volatility
of the average real hourly wage increased at least 30% since 1984.
Accordingly, in Table 2.2 we also present results for two sub-periods of the U.S. data
2The di↵erence between the standard deviations of the detrended log unemployment rates of
high-skill and low-skill workers across countries remains statistically significant at the 1% level on a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (z =  2.934, p = 0.0033) even if we exclude the observations relative
to France, Germany and Luxembourg – three countries for which the results are obtained from
smaller samples and may therefore be less reliable.
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Figure 2.1: Cyclical volatility of the unemployment rate in the
United States, 40-quarters-ahead, by skill group
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created by splitting the sample in the first quarter of 1984. In the 1976:Q1–1983:Q4
sub-period, the volatility of the detrended log unemployment rate is about 14% lower
for high-skill workers than for low-skill workers. In contrast, in the 1984:Q1–2016:Q4
sub-period the detrended log unemployment rate is 18% more volatile for high-skill
workers than for low-skill workers. The change is mostly driven by a decrease in
the standard deviation for low-skill workers (from 14.57 to 11.03), as there is only a
slight increase in the standard deviation for high-skill workers (from 12.55 to 13.05).
In Figure 2.1 we o↵er another perspective of the change in the relative size of the
cyclical volatilities of the unemployment rates of high-skill and low-skill workers.
The lines depict 10-years-ahead rolling-window standard deviations of the detrended
log unemployment rate. We can see that the forward volatility is initially lower
for high-skill workers, but the gap relative to low-skill workers fades as we enter
the 1980s, and by the mid-1980s the 10-years-ahead volatility is slightly higher for
high-skill workers. The gap widens in the early and mid-1990s and remains large
for the rest of the sample, with the 10-years-ahead volatility being 15% higher for
high-skill workers than for low-skill workers at the end of the sample.
In this paper we generalize the framework proposed by C¸enesiz and Guimara˜es (2017)
to a context of two-skill groups, and we use this setup to address the di↵erences in
the cyclical volatility of the unemployment rates of high-skill and low-skill workers.
We consider an economy in which households have a variety of high-skill and low-
skill workers, each o↵ering a specific skill from which monopolistic profits can be
derived. Households bear the cost of searching and finding new jobs, and they decide
how many new high-skill and low-skill jobs are created each period. While costly,
expanding the labor supply on the extensive margin (i.e., employment) benefits the
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household by increasing the number of skill varieties that yield monopolistic profits.
On the production side, we assume that firms employ capital and a labor bundle
that consists of hours of work from a variety of high-skill and low-skill workers. We
assume that firms have a taste for variety with respect to their labor inputs, and
this materializes in higher productivity when a wider array of skills is used.
Unemployment dynamics in our model are dictated by two forces. When a positive
technology shock hits the economy both productivity and wages increase, raising
the value of the marginal new (high-skill or low-kill) job from which the household
may extract monopolistic profits. This allows households to o↵set the corresponding
search costs for those new jobs, creating an incentive for employment to expand.
On the firm side, employment expansion is also attractive because of the increasing
returns to employment implied by the firm’s taste for variety. In a calibration of
our model to the United States data for the period 1976:Q1–2016:Q4, job search
costs are relatively larger for high-skill workers than for low-skill workers. Yet, in
the aftermath of a positive technology shock employment expansion relative to the
steady state is similar for high-skill and low-skill workers. Higher unemployment rate
volatility for high-skill workers then follows from their lower average unemployment
rate.
The numerical simulations of the calibrated model generate a volatility of the
unemployment rate that is 11.4% higher for high-skill workers than for low-skill
workers, a di↵erence that is close to the 9.6% di↵erence observed in the data. Both
results are robust to di↵erent calibrations of the Frisch elasticity, as well as to di↵erent
calibrations of the parameter that governs the firms’ taste for variety and the size
of the monopolistic profits earned by households when exploiting each skill variety.
However, our results indicate that the model cannot easily explain the shift in the
volatility patterns of the unemployment rates that occurred in the United States
during the mid-1980s and early 1990s.
Research that examines di↵erences in the volatility of the unemployment between
high-skill and low-skill workers is relatively scarce, but some studies consider the
volatility gap in other contexts. Mukoyama and S¸ahin (2006) study di↵erences in the
costs of business cycles for high-skill and low-skill workers in a model with incomplete
markets and skill heterogeneity, and conclude that the costs of business cycles are
between three and ten times larger for unskilled workers. In their model, however,
the transitions into and out of unemployment are determined exogenously, and imply
higher volatility of the unemployment rate for low-skill workers. In contrast, in
our model transitions out of unemployment are determined by the decisions of the
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households with respect to job search, and thus unemployment volatility is determined
endogenously. More recently, Hagedorn et al. (2016) introduce skill heterogeneity
and capital-skill complementarity (as in Krusell et al., 2000) in a standard search and
matching model to examine the e↵ects of taxes on unemployment. They argue that
capital-skill complementarity amplifies the volatility of productivity for high-skill
workers, driving unemployment volatility upwards, and that higher taxes improve
the relative productivity of low-skill, shifting rises in the unemployment to high-skill
workers. In our model, unemployment volatility is instead amplified by the presence
of economic gains associated with the expansion of employment – both for households,
in the form of monopolistic profits over each skill variety, and for firms, in the form
of a variety e↵ect that increases productivity.
To some extent, our paper is also related to the literature on the unemployment
volatility puzzle. In his influential contribution, Shimer (2005) shows that the business
cycle volatility of U.S. unemployment is about 20 times larger than the business
volatility of unemployment generated by the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search
and matching model. This finding has spawned a large literature that aims at
improving the amplification mechanism of the search and matching framework. A
set of studies argues that some form of wage rigidity is necessary to generate realistic
unemployment fluctuations. A few examples of this line of research include the
role bargaining delays emphasized by Hall and Milgrom (2008), the staggered wage
bargaining proposed by Gertler and Trigari (2009), or the presence of information
asymmetries proposed by Kennan (2010). Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), on the
other hand, argue that an alternative calibration for value of non-market activity
and the workers’ bargaining weight are su cient to increase unemployment volatility
on the canonical search and matching model. Pissarides (2009) emphasizes instead
that fixed matching costs can increase the volatility of unemployment while retaining
the wage flexibility for new matches observed in the data. More recently, Petrosky-
Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) support Pissarides’ view by arguing that financial
frictions generate an entry cost to job creation, and that such cost increases volatility
in the labor market.
Our paper makes a contribution to this discussion by introducing an alternative
framework to model unemployment in an otherwise standard real business cycle
model. Unlike the standard search and matching model, in which wage increases
that occur in response to a positive shock discourage firms from creating jobs, the
mechanisms in our model combine to favor employment expansion and amplify
volatility in the labor market. On the firm side the variety e↵ect raises productivity
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when employment expands, o↵setting the detrimental e↵ects of wage increases on job
creation. On the household side the expansion of employment increases the number
of skill varieties from which monopolistic profits can be derived, o↵setting the costs
of searching for new jobs. The model calibrated for the period 1976:Q1–2016:Q1
generates realistic business cycle volatility for the U.S. unemployment rates. For
high-skill workers the unemployment rate is about 9.4 times more volatile than
output in the data, and about 8.9 times more volatile than output in the simulations
of the model. For low-skill workers the unemployment rate is about 8.6 times more
volatile than output in the data, and about 8.1 times more volatile than output in
the simulations of the model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we present the model and
describe its competitive equilibrium. In Section 2.3 we discuss how we calibrate the
model to United States data. In Section 2.4 we compare the results of our numerical
simulations with the data. In Section 2.5 we perform a sensitivity analysis with
respect to a set of key parameters. We close with some concluding remarks in Section
2.6.
2.2 Model
For ease of exposition and notation, in what follows we use the term skilled to refer
to high-skill workers. We denote any variable that relates to skilled workers with
the subscript s. Similarly, we use the term unskilled to refer to low-skill workers.
We denote any variable that relates to unskilled workers with the subscript u. We
assume that households live infinitely, and time is discrete and indexed by t   0.
2.2.1 Firms
The technology of a representative firm is described by a Cobb-Douglas function:
yt = atk
↵
t l
1 ↵
t , (2.1)
where yt is the output of final goods, kt is the capital input, lt is the labor input, and
at is a common productivity factor. The parameter ↵ is the capital share, 0 < ↵ < 1.
The law of motion of the common productivity factor is given by:
log at = ⇢ log at 1 + ✏t, (2.2)
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where ✏t is an i.i.d. productivity shock, ✏t ⇠ N (0,  ✏) for all t   0. The labor input
lt is a composite of skilled labor, ls,t, and unskilled labor, lu,t:
lt = l
 
s,tl
1  
u,t , (2.3)
where 0 <   < 1.
The input lu,t is a composite of hours of work, and is described by a constant elasticity
of substitution function over a continuum of unskilled workers indexed by j:
lu,t =
"
j2Ju,t
hu,t (j)
✓ dj
# 1
✓
, (2.4)
where hu,t (j) are the hours worked by the j-th unskilled worker, Ju,t is the set of
unskilled workers employed by the firm at time t, and 1/ (1  ✓) is the elasticity
of substitution between any two unskilled workers. Because our model features
unemployment, Ju,t is a subset of all existing unskilled workers, Ju,t ⇢ Ju. The input
ls,t is defined in a similar way:
ls,t =
"
j2Js,t
(!hs,t (j))
✓ dj
# 1
✓
, (2.5)
where hs,t (j) are the hours worked by the j-th skilled worker, Js,t ⇢ Js is the set
of skilled workers employed by the firm at time t, and 1/ (1  ✓) is the elasticity
of substitution between any two skilled workers, 0 < ✓ < 1. The parameter ! > 1
captures a productivity advantage of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers.
The firm sells its output in a perfectly competitive market, and – given the law of
motion of the common productivity factor – it solves:
max
yt,kt,lt,lu,t,ls,t,hu,t(j),hs,t(j)
yt rtkt 
j2Ju,t
wu,t (j)hu,t (j) dj 
j2Js,t
ws,t (j)hs,t (j) dj,
(2.6)
subject to (2.1) and (2.3)–(2.5), where rt is the rental rate of capital, wu,t (j) is the
hourly wage paid to the j-th unskilled worker, and ws,t (j) is the hourly wage paid
to the j-th skilled worker. The first order conditions of the firm’s maximization
problem imply:
rt = ↵
yt
kt
(2.7)
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Wu,t =
"
j2Ju,t
wu,t (j)
✓
✓ 1 dj
# ✓ 1
✓
(2.8)
Ws,t = !
 1
"
j2Js,t
ws,t (j)
✓
✓ 1 dj
# ✓ 1
✓
(2.9)
Wu,t = (1  ↵) (1   ) yt
lu,t
(2.10)
Ws,t = (1  ↵)   yt
ls,t
(2.11)
hu,t (j) =

wu,t (j)
Wu,t
  1
✓ 1
lu,t (2.12)
hs,t (j) =

ws,t (j)
Ws,t
! ✓
  1
✓ 1
ls,t (2.13)
where Wu,t is the unskilled wage index, as defined in (2.8), and Ws,t is the skilled
wage index, as defined in (2.9).
2.2.2 Households
The representative household is composed of a continuum of unskilled members of
mass Nu, and a continuum of skilled members of mass N s, with Nu +N s = 1; both
types of household members are indexed by a variety index j. At any given time t
a fraction nu,t 2 [0, Nu] of unskilled members and a fraction ns,t 2 [0, N s] of skilled
members are employed. As in Merz (1995), household members pool their income as
a mechanism to completely insure each other against unemployment. The period
utility of the household is given by:
Ut = log ct  
nu,t
0
 u
(hu,t)
1+ u
1 +  u
dj  
ns,t
0
 s
hs,t (j)
1+ s
1 +  s
dj, (2.14)
where ct is the consumption of the household, 1/ s and 1/ u are the Frisch elasticities
of labor supply for skilled and unskilled household members, and  s and  u are
measures of the disutility of work for skilled and unskilled household members.
At the end of any given period t a fraction of the household members who are
employed lose their jobs. The household members who are unemployed engage in a
costly search for new jobs, and thus nu,t and ns,t change over time in response to
the interplay between job destruction and job creation. The law of motion of nu,t is
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given by:
nu,t = (1   u)nu,t 1 + xu,t, (2.15)
where  u is the fraction of unskilled workers who lose their jobs, and xu,t are the new
jobs for unskilled members at time t. Likewise, the law of motion of ns,t is given by:
ns,t = (1   s)ns,t 1 + xs,t, (2.16)
where  s is the fraction of unskilled workers who lose their jobs, and xs,t are the new
jobs for unskilled members at time t. The laws of motion (2.15) and (2.16) imply
that new jobs created at time t become immediately productive. In this economy,
unskilled unemployment is given by qu,t = (Nu   nu,t), the skilled unemployment is
given by qs,t = (N s   ns,t), and aggregate unemployment is given by qt ⌘ qs,t+ qu,t =
1  ns,t  nu,t. The unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled workers are given by
us,t =
qs,t
NS and uu,t =
qu,t
NU , respectively.
The household holds a stock of capital for which the law of motion is:
kt+1 = (1   k) kt + it, (2.17)
where  k is the constant depreciation rate, and it is the household’s investment.
The household spends its income on consumption, investment, and costly job searching
activities for unskilled and skilled workers who are unemployed. The budget constrain
of the household is given by:
ct+it+gu,t (xu,t)+gs,t (xs,t) 
nu,t
0
wu,t (j)hu,t (j) dj+
ns,t
0
ws,t (j)hs,t (j) dj+rk,tkt,
(2.18)
where gu,t (xu,t) and gs,t (xs,t) are strictly increasing functions that measure the costs
of finding unskilled and skilled jobs, respectively. We assume that these costs are
quadratic in the number of new jobs created at time t:
gu,t (xu,t) =  u
✓
xu,t +
1
2
x2u,t
◆
(2.19)
gs,t (xs,t) =  s
✓
xs,t +
1
2
x2s,t
◆
(2.20)
with  u, s > 0.
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The household solves:
max
ct,kt+1,nu,t,ns,t,hu,t(j),hs,t(j),wu,t(j),ws,t(j)
E0
1X
t=0
 tUt (2.21)
subject to (2.12)–(2.13) and (2.15)–(2.20), where   is the common discount factor
in the economy. We anticipate an equilibrium in which there is symmetry across
unskilled workers, and symmetry across skilled workers. For unskilled workers we
have wu,t (j) = wu,t and hu,t (j) = hu,t, 8j 2 [0, nu,t]; for skilled workers we have
ws,t (j) = ws,t and hs,t (j) = hs,t, 8j 2 [0, ns,t]. The first order conditions of the
household’s maximization problem imply:
1 =  Et

ct
ct+1
(1   k + rk,t+1)
 
(2.22)
wu,t = cth
 u
u,t
 u
✓
(2.23)
ws,t = cth
 s
s,t
 s
✓
(2.24)
g
0
u,t (xu,t) = wu,thu,t
1 +  u   ✓
1 +  u
+ Et

  (1   u) ct
ct+1
g
0
u,t (xu,t+1)
 
(2.25)
g
0
s,t (xs,t) = ws,ths,t
1 +  s   ✓
1 +  s
+ Et

  (1   s) ct
ct+1
g
0
s,t (xs,t+1)
 
(2.26)
where g
0
u,t = @gu,t/@xu,t and g
0
s,t = @gs,t/@xs,t, 8t   0.
An aggregate resource constraint closes the model of the economy:
ct + it + gu,t (xu,t) + gs,t (xs,t)  yt. (2.27)
2.2.3 Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices {rt, wst , wut }1t=0
and allocations {yt, ct, kt+1, lt, ls,t, lu,t, nu,t, ns,t, xu,t, xs,t}1t=0 such that firms solve (2.6)
subject to 2.1 and 2.3–2.5, households solve (2.21) subject to (2.12)–(2.13) and
(2.15)–(2.20), the aggregate resource constraint binds, and:
lu,t =
 nu,t
0
hu,t (j)
✓ dj
  1
✓
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ls,t =
 ns,t
0
(!hs,t (j))
✓ dj
  1
✓
given the exogenous process for the common productivity factor described in (2.2).
In the symmetric competitive equilibrium the unskilled and skilled labor inputs used
by the firm and the
lu,t = hu,t (nu,t)
1
✓ (2.28)
ls,t = !hs,t (ns,t)
1
✓ (2.29)
Wu,t = wu,t (nu,t)
✓ 1
✓ (2.30)
Ws,t = !
 1ws,t (ns,t)
✓ 1
✓ . (2.31)
The results (2.28) and (2.29) highlight how the assumption that firms have a taste
for skill variety within each skill group leads to increasing returns to scale in the
unskilled and skilled labor inputs.
2.3 Calibration
In this section we describe the baseline calibration used in our numerical simulations.
We calibrate the model to United States data and define the quarter as the unit
of time. Table 2.3 summarizes the baseline parameter values. For some of the
parameters we use values that are standard in the business cycle literature. We set
the capital share ↵ to 0.36. We set the discount factor   to 0.99 so that annual
interest rate is 4% in the steady state. We set the depreciation rate  k to 0.025 so
that capital depreciation approximates 10% annually. Finally, for the law of motion
of technology we use  ✏ = 0.007 and ⇢ = 0.95.
For the inverse of the Frisch elasticities our baseline calibration considers  s =  u =
1.5, which implies Frisch elasticities of 0.67 for both skilled and unskilled workers.
There is considerable debate about the value of the Frisch elasticity: studies based
on microeconomic data typically yield estimates well bellow 1, while macroeconomic
models often require values in excess of 2 to match the business cycle volatility
observed in the data (see, e.g., Chetty et al. (2011) for a discussion of the mismatch
between micro and macro estimates). Given this lack of consensus and considering
that the behavior of the labor market variables is likely to be a↵ected by the Frisch
elasticities, in Section 2.5 we include  s and  u in our sensitivity analysis.
To calibrate the separation rates  u and  s we turn to empirical estimates available
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in the literature. Chassamboulli (2011) estimates monthly separation rates using
data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey covering the period between
December 2000 and October 2010, finding a separation rate of 0.016 for high-skill
workers and a separation rate of 0.035 for low-skill workers. At quarterly frequency
these estimates imply a separation rate of 0.047 for high-skill workers and a separation
rate of 0.101 for low-skill workers. More recently, Hagedorn et al. (2016) estimate
monthly separation rates using data from the Current Population Survey covering the
period between January 1976 and December 2006 and obtain similar results. Their
estimates indicate a separation rate of 0.0097 for high-skill workers and a separation
rate of 0.0378 for low-skill workers. At quarterly frequency these estimates imply
a separation rate of 0.029 for high-skill workers and a separation rate of 0.109 for
low-skill workers. We consider an average of these two estimates and set  s = 0.038
and  u = 0.105. In our model these values imply that in any given quarter 3.8% of
the skilled workers and 10.5% of the unskilled workers lose their jobs.
We set   = 0.4 so that skilled workers receive 40% of the total wage bill. This number
is consistent with estimates available in the literature for the share of the wage bill
earned by high-skill workers. For example, Machin and Van Reenen (1998) show that
in the United States the share of the wage bill paid to non-production workers (a
proxy for high-skill workers) was 41.4% in 1989. More recently Chongvilaivan et al.
(2009) show that, according to data from the 2002 Annual Survey of Manufactures
published by the U.S. Census Bureau, high-skill workers receive 39.9% of the wage
bill.
For the productivity advantage of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers, !, we
turn to estimates from the literature on skill-related wage di↵erences. For example,
Katz and Murphy (1992) show that the wage premium of college educated workers
(a proxy for high-skill workers) in the U.S. was between 50% and 70% relative to
non-college educated workers during the period between the early 1960s to the late
1980s. In another study, Berman et al. (1998) find that the wages of non-production
workers (a proxy for high-skill workers) are about 50% higher than the wages of
production workers (a proxy for low-skill workers) in OECD countries. More recently,
van der Velden and Bijlsma (2016) estimate that in a sample of 22 OECD countries
workers with a college degree earn, on average, almost 30% more than workers
without a college degree. To the extent that di↵erences in wages reflect di↵erences in
worker productivity, these estimates would suggest that the productivity advantage
of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers is between 30% and 70%. Accordingly,
in our baseline calibration we set ! = 1.5.
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Table 2.3: Baseline calibration
Description Parameter Value
Firms:
Capital’s income share ↵ 0.36
Capital depreciation rate  k 0.025
Productivity advantage of skilled workers ! 1.5
Skilled workers’ wage bill share   0.40
Elasticity of substitution between workers of same
type
1/ (1  ✓) 6.67
Households:
Discount factor   0.99
Inverse of the Frisch elasticity  s, u 1.5
Separation rate for skilled workers  s 0.038
Separation rate for unskilled workers  u 0.105
Search cost parameter for skilled jobs  s 25.7
Search cost parameter for unskilled jobs  u 5.1
Scaling of disutility from skilled work  s 2.4
Scaling of disutility from unskilled work  u 1.2
Technology:
Standard deviation of technology shock  ✏ 0.007
Persistence of the technology process ⇢ 0.95
For the parameter ✓ there are no obvious empirical estimates available in the literature.
In our baseline calibration we set ✓ = 0.85, which implies an elasticity of substitution
of 6.7 between any two workers in the same skill group, and in Section 2.5 we include
this parameter in our sensitivity analysis. We use the remaining four parameters
( s,  u,  s, and  u) to normalize hours worked to one for both skilled and unskilled
workers, and to target the average unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled
workers in the United States in the period 1976:Q1–2016:Q4, which are 2.9% and
6.8%, respectively.3 This yields the calibration  s = 2.4,  u = 1.2,  s = 25.7, and
 u = 5.1. This calibration implies that households face job search costs that are
higher for skilled workers than for unskilled workers. Intuitively, this is a reasonable
assumption: skilled jobs are likely to be more complex than unskilled jobs, and
skilled workers are likely be required to go through more rounds of screening than
unskilled workers to ensure a correct match to a new job, resulting in higher search
costs for skilled workers.
3The Appendix illustrates how we use the hours normalization and our target unemployment
rates to pin down  s,  u,  s, and  u.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Business cycle properties
In this section we compare the business cycle properties of the calibrated model
with the business cycle properties of U.S. data covering the period 1976:Q1–2016:Q4.
While our focus is on the volatility of the unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled
workers, we also examine the behavior of other macroeconomic aggregates. We run
1000 model simulations of as many quarters as in the U.S. sample (164 quarters),
and for each simulation we compute standard deviations, autocorrelations, and
cross-correlations (with output) for the unemployment rates, output, consumption
and investment. The results we report for the model are the means of the simulated
statistics. To compute the equivalent statistics for the U.S. economy we use data on
output, consumption and investment published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
and data on the unemployment rates computed from monthly series of the Current
Population Survey. All variables are log-transformed and presented as deviations
from a Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend with the smoothing parameter set to 1600.
We present the results in Table 2.4.
The calibrated model replicates the business cycle volatility of the unemployment
rates quite well. The simulated standard deviation of the unemployment rate is
12.70 for skilled workers and 11.44 for unskilled workers, a di↵erence that makes the
business cycle volatility 11% larger for skilled workers. In the data, the standard
deviation of the unemployment rate is 12.94 for skilled workers and 11.80 for unskilled
workers, a di↵erence that makes the business cycle volatility around 10% larger for
skilled workers. Moreover, in the model the unemployment rates are substantially
more volatile than output, and the volatility ratios are close to those we observe
in the data. For skilled workers, the unemployment rate is 8.9 times more volatile
than output in our simulations, and 9.4 times more volatile than output in the data.
For unskilled workers, the unemployment rate is 8.1 times more volatile than output
in our simulations, and 8.6 times more volatile than output in the data. Thus, in
terms of the business cycle volatility of unemployment our model outperforms the
canonical search and matching model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
The model also generates realistic business cycle volatility for the time series of
output and investment. The simulated standard deviations of output and investment
are 1.42 and 5.01, respectively, whereas the corresponding standard deviations in the
data are 1.37 and 4.71. Even though the model slightly overestimates the volatility of
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Table 2.4: Standard deviations, autocorrelations and cross correlations with output, from
model simulations and U.S. data, 1976:Q1–2016:Q4
Standard deviation Autocorrelation Correlation with y
y c i us uu y c i us uu c i us uu
Model 1.42 0.32 5.01 12.70 11.44 0.69 0.83 0.28 0.81 0.82 0.77 0.08 -0.84 -0.95
Data 1.37 1.11 4.71 12.94 11.80 0.88 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.87 0.90 -0.80 -0.88
Notes: Standard deviations are in percent. The row labelled “Data” refers to United States quarterly data for the period 1976:Q1–
2016:Q4. The series for output (y), consumption (c) and investment (i) are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The series for the
quarterly unemployment rates (us, uu) are computed from monthly series of the Current Population Survey. The row labelled “Model”
refers to results from 1000 model simulations of 164 quarters each, which is the same number of quarters as in the U.S. sample. The
results are sample means of the statistics computed for each of the 1000 simulations. All variables are log-transformed and presented
as deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend with the smoothing parameter set to 1600.
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both variables, it approximates the relative volatility of investment remarkably well:
the time series for investment is 3.5 more volatile than output in the model, and 3.4
times more volatile than output in the data. One shortcoming of our model is that it
generates time series for consumption that are too smooth. The simulated standard
deviation of consumption is 0.32, whereas in the data the standard deviation is 1.11,
about 3.5 times larger.
Turning to the simulated first-order autocorrelation coe cients, we see that for all
variables presented in Table 2.4 the model generates coe cients that are smaller
than those we estimate from the data. The model performs best when replicating the
autocorrelation of the unemployment rates and consumption. For the unemployment
rates of skilled and unskilled workers the simulated autocorrelation coe cients
are 0.81 and 0.82, respectively, and for consumption the coe cient is 0.83. In all
three cases the simulated coe cients are about 10% smaller than the corresponding
coe cients estimated from the data. The model performs worse when replicating the
autocorrelation of output and investment. The simulated autocorrelation coe cients
are 0.69 for output and 0.28 for investment, whereas in the data the coe cients
are 0.88 and 0.92. The di↵erence is particularly striking for investment, with
the coe cient estimated from the data being 3.3 times larger than the simulated
coe cient. Furthermore, the autocorrelation of the simulated time series is much
smaller for investment than for output, whereas in the data the autocorrelation
coe cient is slightly larger for investment than for output.
The model generates reasonable cross correlations between output and the unem-
ployment rates. For skilled workers the cross correlation is -0.84 in the model and
-0.80 in the data. For unskilled workers the cross correlation is -0.95 in the model
and -0.88 in the data. Although the simulated cross correlations are between 5% and
8% larger than what we observe in the data, the model correctly generates a cross
correlation between output and the unemployment rate that is larger for unskilled
workers. The simulated co-movement of output and consumption is also plausible,
with the model generating a cross correlation of 0.77 between the two variables, a
figure that is about 12% smaller than its equivalent in the data. However, the model
performs poorly in terms of the cross correlation between output and investment.
In the data the two variables exhibit very tight co-movement, but in the calibrated
model we obtain a very small positive cross correlation.
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Figure 2.2: Response of selected model variables to an exogenous
technology shock
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Notes: The dashed lines represent the response of selected model variables to a one standard
deviation ( ✏ = 0.007) exogenous technology shock. The horizontal axis measures the number of
periods after the shock. All variables are presented as percent deviations from their respective
steady state values.
2.4.2 Impulse response functions
We now analyze how a set of model variables behave in response to an exogenous
technology shock. In Figure 2.2 we depict the response of output, consumption,
investment, employment, unemployment, hours worked, and wages to a one standard
deviation positive technology shock in our calibrated model. All variables as presented
as percent deviations from their steady state values. In the top three panels, we see
that the shock produces the usual e↵ects on output, consumption and investment:
all three variables increase after the shock hits the economy, and then gradually
return to their steady state values. Thus, with respect to these variables our model
essentially retains the responses typically observed in a standard business cycle model.
When the shock hits the economy, skilled employment initially increases less than
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unskilled employment because the cost of searching for new jobs is relatively higher for
skilled workers than for unskilled workers. This initial expansion in employment gives
rise to the variety e↵ect on the firms’ side and contributes to increase productivity.
This, in turn, drives further employment expansions by making the marginal new job
(skilled or unskilled) valuable enough to o↵set the respective search cost. Because
of the complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor in the firms’ labor
bundle, the expansion of unskilled employment increases the productivity of skilled
workers. As a result, more new skilled jobs are now valuable enough to o↵set their
corresponding search costs, and additional expansions of skilled employment become
economically attractive for the households. While the same e↵ect exists for unskilled
workers, the strong initial expansion driven by the lower search costs reduces the
scope for additional employment growth. These dynamics cause skilled employment
to peak later than unskilled employment, although they both expand by around
0.8% relative to their steady state values.
Because the unemployment rate of skilled workers is lower than the employment
rate of unskilled workers, the employment growth results in a stronger compression
of the unemployment rate for skilled workers than for unskilled workers. At the
peak of skilled employment expansion, the unemployment rate for skilled workers is
compressed by around 26% relative to its steady state value. In contrast, at the peak
of unskilled employment expansion, the unemployment rate for unskilled workers is
compressed by only 11% relative to its steady state value.
When the exogenous shock hits the economy, hours worked increase for skilled and
unskilled workers. The productivity shock increases the value of market work and
creates an incentive to substitute leisure for labor. As employment expands, the
number of skill varieties from which households derive monopolistic profits increases,
and the resulting gains allow households to shift part of the labor supply from the
intensive margin (hours) to the extensive margin (employment). The initial increase
in hours is slightly larger for skilled workers: relative to the steady state, skilled
hours expand by as much as 0.28%, whereas unskilled hours expand by as much
as 0.18%. Wages respond to the exogenous shock with a profile similar to that of
output, increasing when the shock hits the economy and then gradually converging
back to their steady state value. For unskilled workers, the stronger employment
expansion immediately after the shock is associated with a steeper compression of
the wages early on, but smoother declines in subsequent periods.
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2.4.3 Unemployment rate volatility: pre-1984 and post-1984
2.4.3.1 Baseline simulations
In Section 2.1 we have seen that, starting in the mid-1980s, the business cycle volatility
of the U.S unemployment rates experienced some changes. The unemployment
rate was slightly more volatile for low-skill workers than for high-skill workers
in the 1976:Q1–1983:Q4 sub-period, but more volatile for high-skill workers in
the 1984:Q1–2016:Q4 sub-period. These patterns of volatility take place against
di↵erent labor market conditions. The first di↵erence, although small, pertains to the
unemployment rates themselves. In the pre-1984 sub-period the unemployment rates
averaged 2.9% for high-skill workers and 6.7% for low-skill workers; in the post-1984
sub-period they averaged 3.1% for high-skill workers and 7.5% for low-skill workers.
The second di↵erence, much more substantial, pertains to the share of high-skill
workers in the labor force. In the pre-1984 sub-period the share of high-skill workers
in the labor force averaged 17.2%, whereas in the post-1984 sub-period that share
averaged 26%.
In this section we investigate whether our calibrated model can replicate the di↵erent
patterns of volatility of the unemployment rates in the pre-1984 and post-1984
sub-periods. We proceed as before: we run 1000 simulations of as many quarters
as in the relevant sub-period (32 quarters in 1976:Q1–1983:Q4, 132 quarters in
1984:Q1–2013:Q4), and for each of the simulations we compute standard deviations,
autocorrelations, and cross correlations (with output) for the unemployment rates,
output, consumption and investment. We then compute the sample means of the
statistics obtained in each of the 1000 simulations, and we compare them to the
corresponding statistics computed from the U.S. data. In all simulations we retain
the baseline calibration summarized in Table 2.3, except for  s,  u,  s, and  u, which
we use to normalize hours worked to one and to target the unemployment rates
observed in each of the simulated sub-periods.
We present the results of our analysis in Table 2.5. On the simulations for the
sub-period 1976:Q1–1983:Q4, the model generates unemployment rates that are more
volatile for skilled workers than for unskilled workers, with the standard deviation
being about 20% larger for skilled workers. This is in clear contradiction with the
U.S. data, which show the business cycle volatility of the unemployment rate to
be about 14% lower for skilled workers during that period. On the simulations for
the sub-period 1984:Q1–2016:Q4, the model correctly generates a volatility for the
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unemployment rates that is higher for skilled workers than for unskilled workers.
However, the simulated volatility gap is about 8%, whereas in the data the volatility
gap is about 18%. Moving between sub-periods, the model correctly replicates the
increase in the volatility of the unemployment rate of skilled workers, but fails to
account for the decrease in the volatility of the unemployment rate of unskilled
workers.
For both periods our simulations generate time series that are more volatile for
investment than for output. For the sub-period 1976:Q1–1983:Q4 the model yields a
volatility ratio of 3.8, exceeding the ratio observed in the data by about 36%. For the
period 1984:Q1–2016:Q4 the model performs slightly better, yielding a volatility ratio
that is about 13% smaller than the ratio observed in the data. As before, consumption
is much smoother in the model than in the U.S. data. For both periods the model
simulations yield a volatility for consumption that is about 22% of the volatility of
output, whereas in the data the volatility of consumption is between 76% and 85% of
the volatility of output. One important mismatch is that, in general, the calibrated
model yields lower levels of volatility for output, consumption and investment on the
simulations for the 1976:Q1-1983:Q4 sub-period. In contrast, the data show that, in
general, the volatility in 1976:Q1-1983:Q4 sub-period is actually higher than in the
1984:Q1–2016:Q4 sub-period. The results, however, are from simulations where the
standard deviation of the exogenous technology shock is assumed to remain constant
across the two sub-periods, and in light of the evidence presented in the literature
(see, e.g., Kim and Nelson, 1999) this assumption might be somewhat problematic.
All variables exhibit a lower first-order autocorrelation on the simulations that
correspond to the 1976:Q1–1983:Q4 sub-period. For output, consumption, and the
unemployment rates, however, the data show that autocorrelations coe cients are
only marginally smaller during this sub-period when compared to the post-1984 sub-
period. For investment, the results from the model are a qualitative approximation
to the data, although the simulated autocorrelation coe cients are substantially
smaller than the equivalent coe cients in the data.
Except for investment, the cross correlations with output are not substantially
di↵erent across the two sub-periods, both in the calibrated model and in the data.
The model generates negative correlations between the unemployment rates and
output that approximate the data quite well, and it yields a positive correlation
between consumption and output that is only slightly smaller than in the data. As
before, the model performs poorly in terms of replicating the correlation between
investment and output. For the 1984:Q1–2016:Q4 sub-period the model predicts a
25
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positive cross-correlation that is much smaller than the correlation observed in the
data. For the 1976:Q1–1983:Q4 sub-period the mismatch is more severe, with the
model yielding a small negative correlation, whereas in the data the correlation is
strongly positive.
With some exceptions, the results presented in this section show that adjusting
our baseline calibration to account for di↵erences in the relative supply of skilled
workers and in the average unemployment rates across the pre-1984 and post-1984
sub-periods is insu cient to replicate certain features of the U.S. data. Some of the
shortcomings of our simulations – such as the failure to replicate the lower volatility
of output, consumption and investment in the 1984:Q1–2016:Q4 sub-period – are
likely to be unrelated to the key feature of our model (i.e., the framework proposed
to model unemployment). Other shortcomings – such as the failure to account for
the change in the volatility gap of the unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled
workers – speak to the core of our model and therefore warrant further examination.
2.4.3.2 Changing parameter calibration
For the purposes of our study, the key shortcoming of the sub-period simulations lies
in the failure to fully account for the changes in the volatility of the unemployment
rates. In this section we investigate whether the issue is amenable to di↵erent
calibrations of ✓, the parameter which is at the core of our framework to model
unemployment. This parameter influences how strong the “taste for variety” is on
the firm side, and how large are the monopoly gains that households can extract
from each specific skill variety. We examine to what extent a di↵erent calibration for
✓ in each of the sub-periods contributes to improve the fit between the simulations
and the U.S. data. As before, we retain the baseline calibration summarized in Table
2.3 for all other parameters except for  s,  u,  s, and  u, which we once again use
to normalize hours worked to one, and to target the unemployment rates observed
in each of the simulated sub-periods.
In Table 2.6 we report results from simulations in which we set ✓ = 0.75 for the
sub-period 1976:Q1–1983:Q4, and ✓ = 0.95 for the sub-period 1984:Q1–2016:Q4. For
the sub-period 1976:Q1–1983:Q4 the model continues to generate unemployment
rates that are more volatile for skilled workers than for unskilled workers, in contrast
with the data, although the simulated volatility gap (16%) is somewhat smaller than
in our baseline results. For the sub-period 1984:Q1–2016:Q4 the model continues
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to generate higher volatility on the unemployment rate of skilled workers, with the
volatility being now about 12% larger relative to the volatility of unemployment
rate of unskilled workers, providing a better approximation to the 18% gap observed
in the data. Thus, the calibration with a variable ✓ contributes to improve the fit
between the model and the U.S. data in terms of the business cycle volatility of
the unemployment rates, although it does not eliminate the fundamental mismatch
recorded in the 1976:Q1–1983:Q4 sub-period.
The new calibrations also improve the results for the business cycle volatility of
output, consumption and investment. In general, the simulated volatility for the
1976:Q1–1983:Q4 sub-period is now higher, and the simulated volatility for the
1984:Q1–2016:Q4 sub-period is now lower. Not only are the simulated standard
deviations closer to its empirical equivalents, but the model now correctly yields
a decrease in the volatility of consumption and investment from the pre-1984 sub-
period to the post-1984 sub-period. For output the calibrated model still predicts
volatility to be higher in the sub-period 1984:Q1–2016:Q4, although the increase
is of a much smaller magnitude than in our baseline results. With respect to the
simulated first-order autocorrelations and cross-correlations with output the new
calibrations yield results that are identical to our baseline results for the sub-period
analysis.
The results suggest that while a calibration in which ✓ varies across sub-periods
contributes to improve the fit between the simulations and the U.S. data, certain
di↵erences are still di cult to rationalize within the framework we propose. In
particular, accounting for the change in the volatility patterns of the unemployment
rates that occurred in the mid-1980s and early 1990s remains a challenge.
2.5 Sensitivity analysis
We now examine the results generated by our model under di↵erent calibrations for
✓ and for the inverse of the Frisch elasticities,  s and  u. We concentrate on these
parameters because they are directly related to the labor market decisions of firms
and households, and because they are either not standard in the literature, as is
the case for ✓, or there is considerable debate about their value, as is the case for
 s and  u. Our simulations show that calibrations involving small values of ✓ (e.g.,
✓ = 0.35) yield unreasonably large standard deviations, time series for investment that
exhibit negative autocorrelation and negative cross-correlation with output, as well
28
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as counterfactual impulse responses functions. This is an indication that our results
do not hold with calibrations that involve small values for ✓, and for that reason we
concentrate on the higher end of the range of admissible values for ✓. We present
results from calibrations involving ✓ = {0.75, 0.85, 0.95} and  s, u = {0.3, 1, 1.5},
and we restrict our attention to the cases in which  s =  u. Our baseline calibration
(✓ = 0.85 and  s, u = 1.5) is thus included in this sensitivity analysis for reference
purposes.
In Table 2.7 we summarize the results of our sensitivity analysis, which for the sake
of brevity we build only for simulations of the full U.S. sample (1976:Q1–2016:Q4).
For each combination of parameters the results are mean statistics from 1000 model
simulations of as many quarters as in the U.S. data (164 quarters). We see that, for
any given value of the Frisch elasticities, the results are relatively stable with respect
to the changes in the value of ✓. Larger values of ✓ are typically associated with a
lower volatility of the unemployment rates, reflecting the fact that larger values of ✓
imply a weaker variety e↵ect on the firm side, and lower monopolistic profits on each
specific skill variety on the household side. These two e↵ects combine to decrease
the attractiveness of expanding employment in response to an exogenous technology
shock, hence the lower volatility of the unemployment rates.
Output, investment and consumption all exhibit lower volatility with larger values
for ✓, but in general the di↵erences across simulations amount to less than 15% of
the respective simulated standard deviations. One important result is that, for any
given calibration of the Frisch elasticities, the ratio between the volatility of the
unemployment rates and the volatility of output is quite robust to the value of ✓.
For unskilled workers, there is a 2% di↵erence in the volatility ratios obtained with
✓ = 0.65 and with ✓ = 0.95. For skilled workers, the di↵erence in the volatility ratios
obtained with ✓ = 0.65 and with ✓ = 0.95 is somewhat larger, ranging from about
7% when  s, u = 1.5 to about 11% when  s, u = 0.5. In all cases, the simulated
ratios provide a good approximation to the data. The unemployment rate of skilled
workers is between 8.6 and 10.9 times more volatile than output in the model, and
9.4 times more volatile than output in the data. The unemployment rate of unskilled
workers is between 8.0 and 8.32 times more volatile than output in the model, and
8.6 times more volatile than output in the data.
For the most part, the simulated autocorrelation coe cients and cross-correlations
with output are very stable over the range of ✓ covered in our sensitivity analysis.
There are, however, two exceptions worth mentioning. First, decreases in ✓ are
associated with decreases in the first-order autocorrelation of investment, particularly
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in calibrations with low values for  s and  u. Second, decreases in ✓ are associated
with decreases in the cross-correlation between investment and output, with the
sensibility to ✓ being again higher in calibrations with low values for  s and  u.
Turning to the e↵ects of  s and  u, we see that for any given value of ✓ the simulated
volatility of output and the unemployment rates is higher on calibrations with low
values for  s and  u (i.e., high Frisch elasticities). On the other hand, the volatility
of consumption and investment is lower on calibrations with low values for  s and  u.
Calibrations with higher values for  s and  u also provide a better approximation for
the relative volatility of investment: with  s, u = 0.5 investment is between 2.5 and
2.8 times more volatile than output, whereas with  s, u = 1.5 the ratio increases to
around 3.5, very close to the 3.4 ratio in the data. Overall, for any given value of ✓
higher values of  s and  u seem to provide the best fit between the model and the
data, indicating that our model works well with Frisch elasticities similar to those
estimated from microeconomic data.
From a qualitative perspective, the results for the volatility of the unemployment
rates are robust to the value of  s and  u: the unemployment rate of skilled workers
is always more volatile than the unemployment rate of unskilled workers. From a
quantitative perspective, higher values of  s and  u generate standard deviations for
the unemployment rates that are closer to the data. The ratios between the volatility
of the unemployment rates and output are also quite stable across di↵erent values of
 s and  u. For skilled workers the calibrations with  s, u = 0.5 yield unemployment
rates that more volatile than output by a factor of around 10, whereas in calibrations
with  s, u = 1.5 the simulated volatility ratios are around 9 (in the data the ratio is
9.4). For unskilled workers the volatility ratios relative to output sit on a narrower
range, with the simulations presented in Table yielding values between 8 and 8.3 (in
the data the ratio is 8.6).
As was the case with ✓, the simulated autocorrelation coe cients and cross-correlations
with output are stable over the range of values of the Frisch elasticities covered in our
sensitivity analysis. Once again, the exceptions are the first-order autocorrelation
of investment and the cross-correlation between investment and output, both of
which are larger under calibrations with lower values for  s and  u (i.e., higher
Frisch elasticities). This result highlights a trade-o↵ present in our simulations:
higher Frisch elasticities contribute to substantially improve the results with respect
to the autocorrelation of investment and the cross-correlation between output and
investment, but at the same time decrease the fit between the model and the data
with respect to the volatility of the unemployment rates, investment, and output.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the business cycle volatility of the unemployment rates of
high-skill and low-skill workers. We present evidence of an unemployment volatility
gap in the United States and in thirteen E.U. countries from the late 1990s onwards,
with the business cycle volatility of the unemployment rate being on average 37%
larger for high-skill workers. Using U.S. data for the period 1976:Q1–2016:Q4, we
also document a change in the volatility patterns of the unemployment rates of
high-skill and low-skill workers. Up to the mid-1980s the business cycle volatility
of the unemployment rate is slightly higher for low-skill workers, but from that
point onwards the volatility of the unemployment rate becomes higher for high-skill
workers, with the gap expanding substantially in the early 1990s.
We introduce a new framework to model unemployment into a business cycle model
with worker heterogeneity, and we use it to examine the unemployment volatility
di↵erences observed in the data. In our model, each worker (high-skill or low-
skill) o↵ers a specific skill variety from which the households extracts monopolistic
profits. Households bear the costs of searching for new jobs, but in equilibrium
such costs are o↵set by the economic gains associated with expanding the number
of skill varieties that are employed. On the firm side there is a variety e↵ect that
raises productivity when the labor input expands on the extensive margin. The
intuition is that as the number of workers with di↵erentiated skills increases, so
does the scope for specialization gains. A calibration of the model matches key
features of the volatility of the unemployment rates in the United States over the
period 1976:Q1–2016:Q4. Specifically, the calibrated model: (i) yields unemployment
rates that are more volatile for high-skill workers than for low-skill workers; (ii)
approximates the standard deviations of the unemployment rates observed in the
data; and (iii) yields unemployment rates that are substantially more volatile than
output, replicating the relative volatility observed in the data.
Our study opens several lines of inquiry that can be addressed in future work. First,
in the present paper we were unable to fully account for the volatility patterns of the
U.S. unemployment rates for the 1976:Q1–1983:Q4 sub-period. However, our analysis
is restricted to calibrations in which both ✓ and the Frisch elasticities are assumed
to be the same for high-skill and low-skill workers, naturally imposing constraints
on the ability of the model to fit the data. A natural next step is to investigate the
e↵ects of calibrating these parameters di↵erently for high-skill workers and low-skill
workers, and to examine whether such di↵erences are compatible with empirical
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evidence available in the literature.
Second, in the present paper we concentrate our analysis on the data from the United
States, and we devote a great deal of attention to the shift in the volatility patterns
of the unemployment rates from the pre-1984 sub-period to the post-1984 sub-period.
However, we also document the presence of a volatility gap in the unemployment
rates of high-skill and low-skill workers for thirteen E.U. countries. Future work
could examine whether the cross-country di↵erences in the size of the volatility gap
can be explained within the framework we propose, and in particular it could assess
to what extent such di↵erences can be related to di↵erences in ✓, the parameter that
governs the elasticity of substitution between workers of the same type.
Finally, future research could also examine three shortcomings observed in our
results, namely: (i) the low volatility of consumption; (ii) the low autocorrelation
of investment; and (iii) the low cross-correlation between output and investment.
Two simple modifications of our model are worth considering. First, in our model
we assume that households pool the income and consumption of high-skill and
low-skill workers, and this may contribute to lower the volatility of consumption. In
reality, there is evidence that couples sort according to schooling (see, e.g., Lewis and
Oppenheimer, 2000; Chiappori et al., 2009), and therefore a more realistic model
might consider high-skill households and low-skill households separately, each with
their own income and consumption streams. Second, in our model we consider a law
of motion for capital that does not account for capital adjustment costs. A natural
extension of our work would be to examine whether including such costs improves
the results with respect to the business cycle properties of investment, while at the
same time retaining the results with respect to the volatility of the unemployment
rates.
Appendix
In what follows, we drop the time subscript to denote the steady state values of the
variables. To calibrate  s,  u,  s, and  u, in the steady state we: (i) normalize hours
worked to one (hu = 1, hs = 1); (ii) take the average unemployment of unskilled
workers as the target for uu; and (iii) take the average unemployment rate of the
skilled workers as the target for us. Given that uu =
qu
NU and qu = (N
u   nu),
targeting a value for uu implies targeting a value for nu as well, taking the size of
the unskilled labor force NU as given. Similarly, targeting a value for us implies
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targeting a value for ns as well, taking the size of the skilled labor force NS as given.
We use the fact that the ratio between ns and nu is constant in the steady state to
write nu and ns as a function of the parameters of the model.
Let   = ns/nu. Given that we normalize steady state hours to one, from (2.4) and
(2.5) we can write:
lu = (nu)
1
✓
ls = ! ( nu)
1
✓
and therefore from (2.3) we obtain the steady state value for the labor input lt,
l =
⇣
! 
1
✓
⌘ 
(nu)
1
✓ . (2.32)
Next we use (2.7) together with the production function (2.1) to define   as the
steady state value of the ratio between kt and lt:
  ⌘ k
l
=
✓
1
↵
✓
1
 
  1 +  k
◆◆ 1
↵ 1
, (2.33)
which is simply a function of the parameters ↵,   and  k. We can use this result
together with (2.32) to write the steady state capital as a function of nu,
k =  l =  
⇣
! 
1
✓
⌘ 
(nu)
1
✓ (2.34)
Finally, we use (2.32) and (2.34) to substitute into the production function in order
to obtain the steady state output as a function of nu:
y =  ↵
⇣
! 
1
✓
⌘ 
(nu)
1
✓ . (2.35)
Then, from the optimality condition (2.10) we obtain:
Wu = (1  ↵) (1   ) ↵
⇣
! 
1
✓
⌘ 
,
which, together with the symmetric equilibrium result (2.30), allows us to write wu
as a function of nu :
wu = (1  ↵) (1   ) ↵
⇣
! 
1
✓
⌘ 
(nu)
1 ✓
✓ , (2.36)
given that in the steady state hu = 1. Plugging this result into the household’s
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optimality condition (2.25) we obtain:
 u = (1  ↵) (1   ) ↵
⇣
! 
1
✓
⌘ 
(nu)
1 ✓
✓
1 +  u   ✓
(1        u) (1 +  u) (1 +  unu) (2.37)
using the fact that in the steady state g
0
u (xu) =  u (1 +  unu) . Given the target for
nu and the calibration for the other parameters, expression (2.37) pins down the
value of  u.
We can use a similar procedure to obtain the the expression used to pin down  s.
We first use the replacement nu =
ns
  in (2.4) and proceed as before to obtain the
steady state output as a function of ns, y =  ↵!  
  1
✓ (ns)
1
✓ . Then, we substitute
this result into the optimality condition (2.11) to obtain:
Ws = (1  ↵)   ↵!  1   1✓ ,
which, together with the symmetric equilibrium result allows us to write ws as a
function of ns :
ws = (1  ↵)   ↵!    1✓ n
1 ✓
✓
s (2.38)
given that in the steady state hs = 1. Plugging this result into household’s optimality
condition (2.26) we obtain:
 s = (1  ↵)   ↵!    1✓ (ns)
1 ✓
✓
1 +  s   ✓
(1    +   s) (1 +  s) (1 +  sns)
using the fact that in the steady state g
0
s (xs) =  s (1 +  sns) . Given the target for
ns and the calibration for the other parameters, expression (2.37) pins down the
value of  s.
Given the steady state values for k, nu, and ns, we can compute the steady state
values of y, i, gu, and gs to substitute into (2.18) in order to obtain the steady state
value of consumption, c. We can then use expressions (2.23) and (2.36) to pin down
the value of  u, and expressions (2.24) and (2.38) to pin down the value of  s.
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Chapter 3
Countercyclical risk aversion in a
two-country international business
cycle model
3.1 Introduction
Attitudes toward risk change in response to economic conditions. People seem to be
more risk averse when economic conditions are bad, and more risk tolerant when
economic conditions are good. Along the economic cycle, risk aversion is low during
expansion periods and high during contraction periods, making attitudes towards
risk countercyclical. Evidence of this relationship has been found in macroeconomic
and financial markets data. For example, Bollerslev et al. (2011) look at the volatility
risk premium of the S&P500 market index as a proxy for risk aversion and study its
variation over time. They find that the volatility risk premium responds to changes
in several macroeconomic variables, and that it decreases when industrial production
growth is strong, a result that is consistent with countercyclical risk aversion. Beber
and Brandt (2006) show how market reactions to information about the state of the
economy are consistent with the concept of countercyclical risk aversion. They look
at how scheduled releases of U.S. macroeconomic information a↵ect the preferences
and beliefs of U.S. Treasury market participants. They show that the risk aversion
implied in bond and option prices decreases in response to positive surprises in
non-farm payroll, consumer price index, or unemployment information. In another
study, Rosenberg and Engle (2002) use option data on the S&P500 market index to
37
compute risk aversion from an estimated time-varying empirical pricing kernel. They
find that risk aversion significantly increases when credit spreads widen and when
the slope of the yield curve flattens, two indicators of worsening economic conditions.
Studies at the aggregate level abstract from di↵erences between market participants
in terms of their actions, attitudes, and expectations about the economy. This makes
it hard to establish exactly how risk aversion moves along the cycle at the individual
level. But many studies that bypass this limitation by using microeconomic data
indeed find that risk aversion is countercyclical. A recent article by Ho↵mann et al.
(2013) looks at the perceptions and actions of a set of Dutch investors during the
2008 financial crisis using matched survey and brokerage data. Investors were asked
a series of qualitative questions designed to elicit their risk aversion, as well as
their expectations for risk and return in the stock markets. The data reveal that
investors’s risk aversion increases when they experience poor stock market returns.
Another study by Guiso et al. (2013) looks at how the crisis a↵ected investors’s risk
aversion using data from a survey of customers of an Italian bank. They analyze
two measures of risk aversion elicited once in 2007, before the crisis, and then
again in 2009, and find a significant increase in both measures in 2009. They also
find that the increase in risk aversion occurs both for those who had experienced
losses, and those who did not. This suggests that people may change their attitudes
towards risk even when they are not directly a↵ected by changes in the surrounding
economic conditions. In earlier work, Guiso and Paiella (2008) use data from a large
Italian survey on household income and wealth to analyze how risk aversion relates
to liquidity constraints and to exogenous background risk. They find that people
become significantly more risk averse when exogenous background risk increases, and
that this e↵ect is more important than the e↵ect of liquidity constraints.
Yet more evidence compatible with countercyclical risk aversion has been found in
studies that rely on controlled experiments to measure individual risk aversion. In a
recent study by Cohn et al. (2015), a set of financial professionals participated in a
experiment in which they were primed to think about either a rising stock market
or a declining stock market. Those primed with the rising stock market scenario
subsequently made riskier choices in an investment task with real monetary payo↵s,
even though their expectations about the odds of success in the task did not di↵er
from the expectations of those primed with the alternative scenario. In another
study by Greenberg (2013), undergraduate students participated in an experiment
in which they were asked to think they would become either wealthy or poor in the
future. The students primed with the wealthy scenario subsequently selected risky
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options more often in a series of lottery choice decisions that involved real monetary
payo↵s. The results of these studies suggest that fluctuations in risk aversion may be
driven by a subconscious response to di↵erent economic contexts. A psychological
mechanism of this kind is able to account for the findings of Guiso et al. (2013)
that show that risk aversion may increase even for individuals who are not directly
a↵ected by adverse aggregate economic conditions.
In the macroeconomics literature the use of preferences that incorporate habit
formation (e.g., Abel, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) has been one way of
introducing countercyclical risk aversion in the models. Under this type of preference
specification risk aversion decreases when consumption goes above a certain reference
level, as would happen during an economic expansion. When consumption drops
below the reference level, risk aversion increases. But there are some limitations to
the habit formation approach. One limitation is that risk aversion remains entangled
with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution: when risk aversion increases the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution decreases, and vice-versa. This makes it hard
to distinguish whether along the economic cycle we are dealing with fluctuations in
risk aversion or fluctuations in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Another
limitation – in light of the studies by Cohn et al. (2015), Greenberg (2013), and
Guiso et al. (2013) – is that in order for the individuals’s risk aversion to change
there needs to be a material change in their own situation (i.e., their consumption
must rise or fall relative to the habit). This mechanism is at odds with the finding
that individuals may become more (or less) risk averse in response to changes in the
surrounding economic context alone.
One convenient way to address these limitations is to work with the recursive
preferences setup proposed by Kreps and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989),
and explored early on in the macroeconomics literature by Weil (1990). A central
feature of this class of preferences is that there is one parameter to govern risk
aversion and another parameter to govern the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
making the two independent. It is then possible to make the parameters dependent
on an aggregate-level state variable, conceptually independent from the material
situation of each individual. This approach has been explored, for example, by
Melino and Yang (2003) in a closed economy setting to investigate if state-dependent
risk aversion or state-dependent elasticity of intertemporal substitution can be used
to address the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) and the risk-free
rate puzzle (Weil, 1989).
In this paper we contribute to the literature by using recursive preferences to introduce
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countercyclical risk aversion in the standard two-country internacional business cycle
model (see Backus et al., 1994). We follow an approach similar to that of Melino and
Yang (2003) by making the risk aversion parameter state-dependent. More specifically,
in our model the parameter that governs the households’s risk aversion is driven
by changes in aggregate output: risk aversion is lower when the economy expands,
and higher when the economy contracts. This is in line with the aggregate-level
findings of Bollerslev et al. (2011), and is compatible with the behavioral findings
of Cohn et al. (2015) and Guiso et al. (2013). We take advantage of the separation
between risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to keep the
latter constant and isolate the e↵ects of risk aversion fluctuations. Our goal is to
understand to what extent countercyclical risk aversion can be used to address key
mismatches that exist between the data and the standard two-country model.
The key intuition underlying our work relates to the standard exchange rate result
obtained under complete markets:
qt+1
qt
=
m⇤t,t+1
mt,t+1
. (3.1)
Expression (3.1) shows that the behavior of the exchange rate (q) is linked to the
behavior of the stochastic discount factor in the home country (mt,t+1) and in the
foreign country (m⇤t,t+1). Because in our model households have recursive preferences,
the stochastic discount factors on the right-hand side of equation (3.1) are twisted
by an additional term not present in the standard case, one that depends on the
continuation utility and its expected value, and also on the parameters that govern
risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (Caldara et al., 2012).
In this paper we exploit this feature of recursive preferences and complement it
with countercyclical risk aversion to introduce an additional layer of variance in
the dynamics of the exchange rate. To some extent, our work relates to other
studies in the literature that exploit this feature to show that risk aversion plays
a role in determining how well DSGE models can mimic asset price behavior. For
example, Tallarini (2000) shows how increased risk aversion contributes to generate
more realistic predictions for the risk-free bond rate and the market price of risk.
More recently, Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) introduce recursive preferences into a
standard DSGE model to study the long term premium on nominal bonds. They find
that a high level of risk aversion helps the model generate a sizable term premium
and a better fit to the empirical moments of bond yields.
We document how countercyclical risk aversion changes some of the predictions of
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the standard two-country international business cycle model. We find that under
reasonable assumptions for the volatility of the risk aversion parameter, our model
significantly reduces the magnitude of the Backus and Smith (1993) puzzle. In the
benchmark version of our model the correlation between the exchange rate and the
consumption ratio is close to 0.5, well below the perfect correlation predicted by the
standard two-country model with complete markets and non-recursive preferences.
On the other hand, we find that countercyclical risk aversion only marginally increases
the volatility of the exchange rate, which nevertheless remains ten times less volatile
than in the data. Furthermore, we find that countercyclical risk aversion has little
e↵ect on the properties of the quantity variables, except for a small reduction in
the cross-country correlation of consumption. However, this reduction does not
significantly contribute to address the quantity anomaly (Backus et al., 1995): our
model still generates a cross-country correlation of output that is much lower than
the cross-country correlation of consumption, in contrast with what we observe in
the data. We then examine whether the results hold under di↵erent assumptions
about the behavior of risk aversion, and under a preference specification over the
consumption-leisure bundle that is di↵erent from the Cobb-Douglas specification
that underlies the standard two-country model.
Our work relates to recent studies that combine recursive preferences with some other
mechanism to address di↵erent puzzles of the standard two country model. Colacito
and Croce (2011) show that a model with recursive preferences and long-run risk
can generate adequate volatility for the exchange rate, stochastic discount factors
that are highly correlated across countries despite a low international correlation of
consumption, and high cross-country correlation in asset returns even in the absence
of a strong correlation in the fundamentals. A subsequent study (Colacito and
Croce, 2013) shows how coupling a similar model with shifts in capital mobility
helps to address the forward premium anomaly (Fama, 1984). The work by Gourio
et al. (2013) looks at how introducing heterogenous country exposure to variable
disaster-risks in a model with recursive preferences contributes to generate volatile
exchange rates, address the Backus and Smith (1993) anomaly, and generate more
realistic cross-country correlations of macroeconomic aggregates and asset returns. In
another study, Benigno et al. (2011) show how the interaction between productivity
shocks and monetary policy or target inflation shocks influences the behavior of the
exchange rate in a model with recursive preferences, and how it can account for the
negative coe cient in the uncovered interest rate parity regression. We add to this
literature by establishing countercyclical risk aversion as another explanation for
some of the puzzles of the two-country model.
41
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe the benchmark
version of our model, and in Section 3.3 we derive the corresponding equilibrium
conditions. In Section 3.4 we calibrate the model and present the results of our
numerical analysis. In Section 3.5 we conduct a sensitivity analysis and perform
robustness checks with respect to assumptions regarding the households’s utility
function. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our study in Section
3.6.
3.2 Model
Our international RBC model builds on Backus et al. (1994). The world economy
is composed of two similar countries, Home and Foreign, each producing one inter-
mediate good and one final good. Intermediate goods, which are used as inputs
in the production of final goods, are imperfect substitutes and are traded interna-
tionally. Final goods, which are used by households for consumption or investment
purposes, are used exclusively within the country that produces them. We move
away from the standard two-country model in our treatment of the household sector:
households have recursive preferences, and they exhibit countercyclical risk aversion
that responds to the aggregate economic conditions in their own country. In what
follows, for any generic variable x we use xt to denote its value (at time t) in the
Home country, and x⇤t to denote its value in the Foreign country. Unless otherwise
necessary for clarity, we present model equations and equilibrium conditions for the
Home country alone.
3.2.1 Households
The representative household of the Home country maximizes a recursive utility
function of the form
Vt =
✓
(1   )U (ct, lt)1  +  Et
 
V 1  tt+1
  1  
1  t
◆ 1
1  
. (3.2)
Here Vt is the lifetime utility, U (ct, lt) is the utility kernel, ct is consumption, lt is
labor, and Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on the information set
available at time t. The parameter   is the rate of time preference,  is the inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and  t measures the household’s risk
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aversion with respect to static gambles over Vt+1. In the benchmark version of the
model we consider a Cobb–Douglas utility kernel:
U (ct, lt) = c
 
t (1  lt)1   , (3.3)
where   is the share of consumption in utility.
Fluctuations in aggregate output drive the risk aversion parameter: when output
expands,  t decreases; when output contracts,  t increases. In the benchmark version
of the model the law of motion for  t is:
 t =     ⇣ log
✓
Yt 1
Yt 2
◆
, (3.4)
where   is the household’s baseline risk aversion, Y is the aggregate output of the
Home country, and ⇣ is a parameter that measures how sensitive the household’s risk
aversion is to changes in aggregate output, here used as a proxy for aggregate economic
conditions. We assume ⇣ > 0 to make risk aversion countercyclical. Equation (3.4)
introduces, in a simple way, three important features in our countercyclical risk
aversion mechanism. First,  t moves around a baseline level of risk aversion; this
is to accommodate the notion that risk aversion has, in part, a stable component
(Dohmen et al., 2011). Second, movements in  t are a response to changes in aggregate
economic conditions; this is motivated by the findings of Cohn et al. (2015) and
Guiso et al. (2013). Third, movements in  t are a lagged response to changes in
aggregate economic conditions; this is line with recent findings by Kim (2014) about
the relationship between risk aversion and the business cycle in the United States.
Later on, in Section 3.5, we consider alternative formulations for the law of motion
of  t and we check how they a↵ect our results.
The household has access to complete financial markets where it can buy one-period
state-contingent assets that pay one unit of consumption in the Home country. The
household’s budget constraint is
ct + it + Et [rb,t+1] bt+1 = wtlt + rk,tkt + bt. (3.5)
Here it is investment in physical capital; rb,t+1 is the price, in period t, of an asset
that pays one unit of Home country’s consumption in a particular state of period
t+ 1, divided by the probability of occurrence of that state given the information
available at t; bt+1 is the quantity of assets with maturity in period t+ 1 purchased
by the household in period t; wt is the wage rate; rk,t is the rental rate of capital;
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and kt is the household’s capital stock in period t. The law of motion for capital is:
kt+1 = (1   ) kt + it, (3.6)
where   is the depreciation rate.
3.2.2 Production of intermediate goods
The representative producer of intermediate goods in the Home country combines
capital and labor using standard Cobb–Douglas technology,
yt = exp (zt) k
↵
t l
1 ↵
t . (3.7)
Here yt is the output of intermediate goods, zt measures total factor productivity,
and ↵ is the output elasticity with respect to capital. Aggregate output in the
Home country is simply the sum of the output of all producers indexed by i over the
continuum [0, 1],
Yt =
1
0
yi,t di. (3.8)
We model the behavior of total factor productivity following Backus et al. (1994):
zt and its foreign equivalent z⇤t follow a bivariate autoregressive process that has
cross-country productivity spillovers and is described by"
zt+1
z⇤t+1
#
=
"
a11 a12
a21 a22
#"
zt
z⇤t
#
+
"
✏t+1
✏⇤t+1
#
. (3.9)
Here a11, a12, a21 and a22 are positive constants, the term ✏t+1 ⇠ N (0,  2✏ ) is the i.i.d.
productivity shock of the Home country, and the term ✏⇤t+1 ⇠ N (0,  2✏⇤) is the i.i.d.
productivity shock of the Foreign country.
The representative producer of intermediate goods sells its output in a perfectly
competitive market and earns profits given by:
⇡IG,t = ptyt   wtlt   rk,tkt, (3.10)
where pt is the price of the intermediate good, wt is the wage rate, and rk,tkt is the
rental rate of capital. The price pt is denominated in units of the Home country’s
final good.
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3.2.3 Production of final goods
The final good of the Home country is a composite of intermediate goods produced
domestically and intermediate goods produced abroad. As in Backus et al. (1994), we
use an Armington (1969) aggregator to describe the technology of the representative
producer of final goods:
dt =
✓
!
1
⇢y
⇢ 1
⇢
h,t + (1  !)
1
⇢ y
⇢ 1
⇢
f,t
◆ ⇢
⇢ 1
, (3.11)
where dt is the output of final goods, yh,t is the input of domestic intermediate goods
used by the Home country, yf,t is the input of foreign intermediate goods used by the
Home country, ! measures the relative preference for domestic intermediate goods,
and ⇢ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign intermediate
goods.
The representative producer of final goods sells its output in a perfectly competitive
market and earns profits given by:
⇡FG,t = dt   ptyh,t   qtp⇤tyf,t, (3.12)
where p⇤t is the price of the foreign intermediate goods and qt is the exchange rate.
The price p⇤t is denominated in units of the Foreign country’s final good, and the
exchange rate is defined as the number of consumption units of the Home country
that are exchangeable for one consumption unit of the Foreign country.
3.2.4 Trade and the exchange rate
The market for intermediate goods clears and the output of the producer of interme-
diate goods of the Home country is either used locally or exported to the Foreign
country. In equilibrium we have:
yt = yh,t + y
⇤
h,t, (3.13)
where yh,t is the quantity that is used in the Home country, and y⇤h,t is the quantity
that is exported to the Foreign country. In the same way, the output of the producer
of intermediate goods of the Foreign country is either used locally or exported to the
45
Home country. In equilibrium we have
y⇤t = yf,t + y
⇤
f,t. (3.14)
where y⇤t is the output of the producer of intermediate goods of the Foreign country,
yf,t is the quantity that is exported to the Home country, and yf,t is the quantity
that is used locally in the Foreign country.
Under complete markets the exchange rate satisfies:
qt+1
qt
=
m⇤t,t+1
mt,t+1
, (3.15)
where mt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor in the Home country, and m⇤t,t+1 is the
stochastic discount factor in the Foreign country. In the Appendix we show that in
the benchmark version of the model:
mt,t+1 =  
ct
ct+1
✓
Ut+1
Ut
◆1   V 1  tt+1
Et
 
V 1  tt+1
 !   t1  t , (3.16)
and by analogy in the Foreign country we have
m⇤t,t+1 =  
c⇤t
c⇤t+1
✓
U⇤t+1
U⇤t
◆1   V ⇤t+11  ⇤t
Et
 
V ⇤t+1
1  ⇤t  
!   ⇤t
1  ⇤t
. (3.17)
We close the complete markets assumption following Benigno et al. (2011). We
specify the initial holdings of the state-contingent assets so that their income, when
converted to the proper unit, provides the same marginal utility across countries.
Let gt be the ratio of the marginal utilities of the asset income in the Home and
Foreign countries,
gt ⌘
@Vt
@ct
@V ⇤t
@c⇤t
1
qt
=
✓
Vt
V ⇤t
◆ ✓ Ut
U⇤t
◆1  c⇤t
ct
qt. (3.18)
We assume that in the initial period gt is equal to one.
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3.3 Equilibrium
The representative household chooses ct, lt, bt+1, and kt+1 in order to maximize (3.2).
The first order conditions with respect to consumption and labor are:
(1   )V  t U (ct, lt)  
@U (ct, lt)
@ct
=  t, (3.19)
(1   )V  t U (ct, lt)  
@U (ct, lt)
@lt
=   twt, (3.20)
where  t is the usual Lagrange multiplier. Taking into account the utility kernel
(3.3), we can combine equations (3.19) and (3.20) to obtain the consumption-leisure
condition
1   
 
ct
1  lt = wt. (3.21)
The Euler equations for the asset holdings and for capital are given by,
mt,t+1 = rb,t+1, (3.22)
Et [mt,t+1 (rk,t+1 + 1   )] = 1. (3.23)
Equations (3.21) to (3.23), together with the stochastic discount factor (3.16), describe
the optimal behavior of the representative household.
The representative producer of intermediate goods chooses the inputs kt and lt in
order to maximize the profit described in equation (3.10), taking into account the
market clearing price pt. The first order conditions of the maximization problem are
pt (1  ↵) ytl 1t = wt, (3.24)
pt↵ytk
 1
t = rk,t. (3.25)
The representative producer of final goods chooses the combination yh,t and yf,t in
order to maximize the profit described in equation (3.12). The first order conditions
of the maximization problem are
yh,t = p
 ⇢
t !dt, (3.26)
yf,t = (qtp
⇤
t )
 ⇢ (1  !) dt. (3.27)
Because the market for final goods is perfectly competitive, the representative
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producer operates with zero profit. If we plug equations (3.26) and (3.27) into
equation (3.12) and then impose a zero-profit condition, we obtain the following
relationship between the prices of the intermediate goods
1 = !p1 ⇢t + (1  !) (qtp⇤t )1 ⇢ . (3.28)
We can also relate the output of final goods with consumption, investment and net
exports. Because the producer of final goods operates with zero profit and final
goods are used locally for consumption or investment, we have
ct + it = ptyh,t + qtp
⇤
tyf,t. (3.29)
Then, we substitute the resource constraint (3.13) into equation (3.29) to obtain
yt =
(ct + it)
pt
+
✓
y⇤h,t   qt
p⇤t
p
yf,t
◆
. (3.30)
The second term on the right hand side of equation (3.30) represents the net exports
(nx), and we define ⌧ ⌘ qt (p⇤t/pt) as the terms of trade.
If we substitute the home and foreign stochastic discount factors into the exchange
rate equation (3.15) and re-arrange terms, we obtain:
c⇤t+1qt+1
ct+1
✓
Ut+1
U⇤t+1
◆1  
=
c⇤t qt
ct
✓
Ut
U⇤t
◆1   V ⇤t+11  t⇤
Et
 
V ⇤t+1
1  ⇤t  
!    ⇤t
1  t⇤
 
V 1  tt+1
Et
 
V 1  tt+1
 !  t  1  t ,
(3.31)
which we can then re-write as:
gt+1
✓
Vt+1
V ⇤t+1
◆  
= gt
✓
Vt
V ⇤t
◆   V ⇤t+11  ⇤t
Et
 
V ⇤t+1
1  ⇤t  
!   ⇤t
1  ⇤t
 
V 1  tt+1
Et
 
V 1  tt+1
 !  t  1  t (3.32)
to obtain the law of motion for the ratio of the marginal utilities of income in the
Home and Foreign countries.
In the Appendix we show that the steady state values of capital and labor are:
kss =
 ⌦
⌦↵    ⌦+   , (3.33)
lss =
 
⌦↵    ⌦+   , (3.34)
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where ⌦ =
⇣
1
↵
⇣
1
  +     1
⌘⌘ 1
↵ 1
and   =  1   (1  ↵)⌦↵. From the expressions
(3.33) and (3.34) it is then straightforward to compute the steady state values of the
remaining model variables.
3.4 Results
In this section we calibrate the benchmark version of the model and examine its
statistical properties. In particular, we investigate whether the countercyclical risk
aversion mechanism influences the behavior of the exchange rate and of the quantity
variables. We solve our model using perturbation methods (see, e.g., Judd and Guu,
1992, 1997; Judd, 1996; Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004; Swanson et al., 2005), and
we use a third-order approximation because of the role that risk aversion plays in
our theoretical economy (see, e.g., Caldara et al., 2012).
3.4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the driving process for productivity following Backus et al. (1994).
We assume that the standard deviation of the productivity shocks is the same in
both countries, and that shocks are correlated across countries:  ✏ =  ✏⇤ = 0.00852,
Corr (✏, ✏⇤) = 0.258. For the matrix coe cients in the law of motion of productivity
we have "
zt+1
z⇤t+1
#
=
"
0.906 0.088
0.088 0.906
#"
zt
z⇤t
#
+
"
✏t+1
✏⇤t+1
#
. (3.35)
In Table 3.1 we present the calibration for the remaining parameters of our model.
For the parameters that relate to household utility, we follow the recent study by
Gourio et al. (2013): we set the consumption share in utility to 0.34, the rate of
time preference to 0.994, the baseline risk aversion to 8.5, and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution to 2, which implies  = 0.5. The calibration for the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution exceeds the estimates obtained by Hall (1988),
but it is nevertheless consistent with a series of studies that find the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution to be in excess of 1 (see, e.g., Hansen and Singleton,
1982; Attanasio and Weber, 1989; Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Mulligan, 2004; Guvenen,
2006), as argued by Gourio et al. (2013). The value  = 0.5 is also in line with the
calibration used by Colacito and Croce (2011).
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Table 3.1: Baseline parameter calibration
Symbol Value
Rate of time preference   0.994
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/ 2
Share of consumption in utility   0.34
Baseline risk aversion   8.5
Sensitivity of risk aversion to output fluctuations ⇣ 170
Depreciation rate   0.025
Capital share in the output of intermediate goods ↵ 0.36
Elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods
⇢ 2.0
Relative preference for local intermediate goods ! 0.85
Notes: The rate of time preference, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the share
of consumption in utility, and the baseline level of risk aversion follow Gourio et al.
(2013). The sensitivity of risk aversion to output fluctuations is set to make risk aversion
movements consistent with Kim (2014). The depreciation rate, the capital share, the
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, and the home bias follow Backus
et al. (1994). See the text for details.
To calibrate ⇣ we rely on empirical evidence about the volatility of risk aversion. The
source for our baseline calibration is the work by Kim (2014), who estimates the risk
aversion parameter for the U.S. economy using the recursive preferences framework.
The estimates from that study indicate that the standard deviation of risk aversion
is between 25% and 30% of the mean value of risk aversion. We set ⇣ = 170 in order
to obtain a standard deviation for  t that is consistent with the lower bound of that
interval.
For the parameters related to the production of final goods and the production of
intermediate goods we take our calibration directly from Backus et al. (1994). We set
the depreciation rate to 0.025, the capital share to 0.36, the elasticity of substitution
between local and foreign intermediate goods to 1.5, and the relative preference for
intermediate goods produced locally to 0.85.
3.4.2 Exchange rate
Table 3.2 presents key moments and correlations of the real exchange rate. We present
two sets of model results: the column “Baseline ⇣” refers to the baseline calibration,
and the column “Higher ⇣” refers to a an alternative calibration in which risk
aversion is twice as sensitive to output fluctuations (⇣ = 340). By comparing these
two columns we get a better sense of how countercyclical risk aversion influences
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the exchange rate statistics. The column “Data” presents, for each statistic, a
corresponding range of empirical estimates obtained from the literature (Backus and
Smith, 1993; Chari et al., 2002; Heathcote and Perri, 2002; Ravn and Mazzenga,
2004; Corsetti et al., 2008; Colacito and Croce, 2011; Thoenissen, 2011).1
The baseline calibration generates insu cient volatility for the exchange rate: the
standard deviation of the exchange rate is about one-fifth of the standard deviation
of output, but in the data this ratio is clearly greater than two. This finding holds
even with our alternative calibration, which generates only a marginal increase in
the relative volatility of the exchange rate. These results show that the benchmark
version of our model cannot easily account for the exchange rate volatility we observe
in the data, regardless of how much risk aversion moves in response to output
fluctuations. The model, however, does a reasonable job of matching the persistency
of the exchange rate. With the baseline calibration the first-order autocorrelation of
the exchange rate is 0.85, close to the upper bound of the empirical range. With the
alternative calibration the autocorrelation falls further in line with the data, but here
too the di↵erence is very small relative to the results from the baseline calibration.
The benchmark version of the model does not generate reasonable correlations
between the exchange rate and both output and the net exports ratio. For output
the baseline calibration yields a correlation with the exchange rate that is around
three and a half times larger than the upper bound of the empirical range; for the net
exports ratio the baseline calibration yields a negative correlation with the exchange
rate, but in the data the correlation is positive. Under the alternative calibration the
results move closer to the data, suggesting that countercyclical risk aversion helps
to mitigate these problems, but the simulated correlations remain far from their
corresponding empirical ranges.
One important result of the model relates to the correlation between the exchange
rate and relative consumption. In the data this correlation is often close to zero or
negative, but theoretical models with complete markets usually produce a correlation
that is equal or close to one. This mismatch is referred to as the Backus and Smith
(1993) puzzle or the consumption-real exchange rate anomaly (Chari et al., 2002).
We see that with the baseline calibration our model produces a correlation between
the exchange rate and relative consumption that is well below one, and with the
alternative calibration the correlation is even lower. These results suggest that the
1A detailed list of references for each of the empirical ranges that appear in the tables is available
upon request.
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Table 3.2: Exchange rate statistics
Model
Variable Data Baseline ⇣ Higher ⇣
Real exchange rate
Standard deviation relative to
output
[2.23, 4.36] 0.205 0.227
Autocorrelation [0.80, 0.83] 0.850 0.821
Correlations with the real ex-
change rate
Output [0.07, 0.13] 0.445 0.403
Net exports [0.14, 0.14] -0.373 -0.248
Relative consumption [ 0.71, 0.15] 0.564 0.211
Note: With exception of the net exports ratio, statistics refer to logged and HP-filtered
variables, with   = 1600 (see Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). Model variables are q for the
real exchange rate, y for output, nx/y for the ratio of net exports to output, and c/c⇤ for
relative consumption. Model results are computed by simulating the theoretical economy
for 10,000 periods starting from the deterministic steady state, and then discarding the
first 1000 periods as a burn-in. The column labeled “Data” presents a range of empirical
estimates obtained from existing literature. See the text for details.
countercyclical risk aversion mechanism embodied in our model can significantly
decrease the magnitude of the consumption-real exchange rate anomaly.
3.4.3 Quantities
Table 3.3 presents key moments and correlations of the quantity variables. As
before, the column “Baseline ⇣” refers to the results of the baseline calibration, the
column “Higher ⇣” refers to the results of the alternative calibration in which risk
aversion is twice as sensitive to output fluctuations, and the column “Data” presents
a corresponding range of empirical estimates obtained from the literature (Backus
et al., 1995; Stockman and Tesar, 1995; Chari et al., 2002; Ambler et al., 2004; Ravn
and Mazzenga, 2004; Dmitriev and Roberts, 2012; Gourio et al., 2013).
The baseline calibration does a reasonable job of replicating the volatility of invest-
ment, employment, and of the net exports ratio relative to the volatility of output.
In the model, investment is about three and a half times more volatile than output,
a value that is close to the upper bound of the empirical range. Employment and the
net exports ratio are both less volatile than output, and the correlations in the model
fall well within the empirical range. The baseline calibration, however, does not
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Table 3.3: Business cycle statistics
Model
Variable Data Baseline ⇣ Higher ⇣
Standard deviations relative to
output
Consumption [0.63, 0.95] 0.310 0.316
Investment [2.78, 3.46] 3.498 3.499
Employment [0.26, 0.86] 0.546 0.547
Net exports [0.11, 0.69] 0.217 0.227
Correlations with output
Consumption [0.69, 0.88] 0.679 0.661
Investment [0.74, 0.94] 0.949 0.948
Employment [0.48, 0.88] 0.960 0.959
Net exports [ 0.41,  0.27] -0.610 -0.596
Cross-country correlations
Output [0.28, 0.64] 0.153 0.152
Consumption [0.15, 0.53] 0.783 0.714
Investment [0.22, 0.61] -0.367 -0.368
Employment [0.20, 0.42] -0.238 -0.245
Notes: With exception of the net exports ratio, statistics refer to logged and HP-filtered
variables, with   = 1600 (see Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). Model variables are y for
output, c for consumption, i for investment, l for employment, and nx/y for the ratio of
net exports to output. Model results are computed by simulating the theoretical economy
for 10,000 periods starting from the deterministic steady state, and then discarding the
first 1000 periods as a burn-in. The column labeled “Data” presents a range of empirical
estimates obtained from existing literature. See the text for details.
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generate su cient volatility for consumption; in fact, with respect to this statistic the
benchmark version of our model does worse than the standard two-country model.
The results from the alternative calibration show these patterns hold even when risk
aversion is more sensitive to output fluctuations, indicating that countercyclical risk
aversion has little impact on the relative volatility of the quantity variables. This
finding is consistent with the results of previous studies that use recursive preferences
and find the volatility of the quantity variables to be largely una↵ected by the level
of risk aversion (see, e.g., Tallarini, 2000; Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012).
In terms of co-movement between output and the other quantity variables, the
benchmark model delivers mixed results. With the baseline calibration the correlation
between output and consumption is close to the lower bound of the empirical range,
and the correlation between output and investment is close to the upper bound of the
empirical range. For the net exports ratio, however, the model yields a correlation
with output that is significantly more negative than in the data. The alternative
calibration generates virtually the same results, indicating that the countercyclical
risk aversion mechanism does little to a↵ect the co-movement of the quantity variables
within each country.
Turning to the international co-movement of the quantity variables, we see that our
benchmark model shares some of the shortcomings of the standard two-country model
of Backus et al. (1994). With the baseline calibration, output is less correlated across
countries than in the data, and consumption is more correlated across countries
than in the data; more important, in the model the cross-country correlation of
consumption is higher than that of output, but in the data we observe the opposite.
Our benchmark model then su↵ers from what is commonly referred to as the quantity
anomaly (Backus et al., 1995). Furthermore, our benchmark model generates negative
cross-country correlations for investment and employment, but in the data those
correlations are positive. The results from the alternative calibration are similar
to those of the baseline calibration, but we observe a non-trivial decrease in the
cross-country correlation of consumption.
3.4.4 The role of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
With recursive preferences the parameters that govern risk aversion and the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution jointly determine the household’s attitude towards
resolution of uncertainty. Under the specification used in equation (3.2), when  t >  
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the household has a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, and when  t <  
the household has a preference for late resolution of uncertainty. In our model  t
varies over time but  remains fixed, and the importance of a fluctuation in  t
is influenced, to some extent, by the size of  . Therefore, it is important to ask
whether the results of the previous sections hold when we consider a di↵erent value
for  . In this section we examine the behavior of the benchmark model when we set
 = 2, implying that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 0.5; this value
is commonly used in the literature (see,e.g., Caldara et al., 2012; Rudebusch and
Swanson, 2012) and compatible with the estimates obtained by Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002).
In Table 3.4 we present the same moments and correlations of Tables 3.2 and 3.3, now
computed using the new calibration for  , both for the case with baseline sensitivity
on the risk aversion parameter (⇣ = 170), and for the case with higher sensitivity on
the risk aversion parameter (⇣ = 340). Overall the benchmark model yields the same
exchange rate statistics as before: (i) the standard deviation of the exchange rate is
still about one-fifth of the standard deviation of output; (ii) the autocorrelation of
the exchange rate remains close to the upper bound of the empirical range; and (iii)
the correlations between the exchange rate and both output and the net exports ratio
still fail to conform with the data. Furthermore, the model behaves as before when we
increase the sensitivity of risk aversion to output fluctuations. We observe an increase
in the relative volatility of the exchange rate and a decrease in its autocorrelation,
but both movements are very small in magnitude. We also observe non-negligible
decreases in the correlations between the exchange rate and output and the net
exports ratio, but the model still generates a correlation between the exchange rate
and output that is too high, and a correlation between the exchange rate and the
net exports ratio that is counterfactually negative.
There is, however, one important di↵erence in the exchange rate statistics obtained
under  = 2. For the case of baseline sensitivity in the risk aversion parameter, the
correlation between the exchange rate and relative consumption (0.78) is significantly
higher than the correlation observed under the  = 0.5 (0.56). Despite this di↵erence,
the e↵ects of the countercyclical risk aversion are still present: the correlation between
the exchange rate and relative consumption continues to exhibits a large decrease
(from 0.78 to 0.49) when we let the  t be twice as sensitive to output fluctuations.
Furthermore, the drop in the correlation is about the same size as the drop in the
correlation observed under  = 0.5. The results provide two important insights
about how countercyclical risk aversion relates to the Backus and Smith (1993)
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puzzle in our model. First, the precise value of  does not seem to matter for how
much the puzzle can be reduced by the countercyclical risk aversion mechanism.
Second, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is slightly less important than
countercyclical risk aversion in shaping the correlation between the exchange rate
and relative consumption. Changing  from 0.5 to 2 increases the correlation by
0.22, while doubling ⇣ decreases it by 0.3 or more.
Under the new calibration for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution there are
some di↵erences in the results that relate to the quantity variables, but in general
the e↵ects of countercyclical risk aversion are similar to those we observe under
the baseline calibration. Relative to output, consumption is now more volatile,
and investment and employment are now less volatile, but the volatility of these
variables is still unrelated to how strongly countercyclical risk aversion is. For the
net exports ratio, the simulated statistics are virtually the same as before. Turning
to the correlations between output and the other quantity variables, we see that
results are the same as before except for consumption, which is now significantly
more correlated with output in the baseline ⇣ case. Moreover, the correlation
between output and consumption is now much more sensitive to the volatility of the
risk aversion parameter: doubling the sensitivity of  t to output fluctuations now
decreases the correlation by 0.23, whereas the baseline calibration for the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution the decrease was almost non-existent. When households
are more reluctant to shift consumption across periods, consumption moves more
in line with output, but the behavior of risk aversion becomes more important in
determining the path of consumption.
The cross-country correlations are somewhat di↵erent with the new elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, but how they relate countercyclical risk aversion is not
changed in any fundamental way. For output, the cross-country correlation is the
same as before and is still insensitive to how much the household’s risk aversion
moves in response to output fluctuations. For investment and employment, the
correlations become more negative than under the baseline calibration of  , but
they too are still insensitive to how much volatile the household’s risk aversion is.
The cross-country correlation of consumption is now somewhat higher than before,
but still decreases when the household’s risk aversion is more sensitive to output
fluctuations. We do observe, however, that the cross-correlation of consumption is
now less sensitive to how strongly countercyclical risk aversion is. Under the baseline
calibration for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, if risk aversion becomes
twice as sensitive to output fluctuations the correlation drops by 0.07, whereas with
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the new calibration for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution the drop is under
0.03.
Taken together, the results we have presented in this section show that the e↵ects
of countercyclical risk aversion observed in our benchmark model hold regardless of
whether the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is high or low. Because the risk
aversion parameter and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are the two core
parameters of the recursive preferences, the results provide a first indication that our
findings are not a spurious byproduct of a specific combination of parameter values,
but instead a robust feature of a model with recursive preferences and countercyclical
risk aversion.
3.4.5 The role of the response lag of risk aversion
An important aspect of the countercyclical risk aversion mechanism described in
section 3.2 is the lag with which the households’s risk aversion moves in response to
fluctuations in output. For simplicity, in the benchmark model we have assumed that
risk aversion movements are determined by the growth rate of output observed in the
preceding period. However, it is important to verify if the results of the benchmark
model hold when we consider a di↵erent lag structure and allow the risk aversion
parameter to move in response to more distant output fluctuations. In this section we
generalize the law of motion of  t to accommodate di↵erent timings in the response
of risk aversion to fluctuations in output,
 t =     ⇣ log
✓
Yt j
Yt j 1
◆
. (3.36)
While there are no obvious constraints on how high j can be, we concentrate our
analysis on a limited set of values. We turn to the empirical evidence provided
by Kim (2014) about the correlation between risk aversion and the U.S. business
cycle to determine the range of values of k we should consider in our analysis. Kim
(2014) reports estimates of the correlation between risk aversion,  t, and the (lagged)
monthly U.S. unemployment rate, Ut j, for di↵erent values of j. The estimated
correlations increase with j, being highest at the 12-month lag and then gradually
decreasing for longer lags, with the correlations reported for 18 and 24 months being
at least 85% as large as the correlation reported for 12 months. Taking this evidence
into account, here we study the behavior of our model with lags up eight quarters
(j = 8) in equation (3.36).
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Table 3.4: The role of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution
Baseline EIS EIS = 0.5
Variable
Baseline
⇣ Higher ⇣
Baseline
⇣ Higher ⇣
Real exchange rate
Standard deviation relative to
output
0.205 0.227 0.211 0.232
Autocorrelation 0.850 0.821 0.849 0.823
Correlations with the real ex-
change rate
Output 0.445 0.403 0.448 0.408
Net exports -0.373 -0.248 -0.362 -0.247
Relative consumption 0.564 0.211 0.783 0.493
Standard deviations relative to
output
Consumption 0.310 0.316 0.485 0.490
Investment 3.498 3.499 2.947 2.950
Employment 0.546 0.547 0.395 0.395
Net exports 0.217 0.227 0.215 0.224
Correlations with output
Consumption 0.679 0.661 0.898 0.661
Investment 0.949 0.948 0.934 0.948
Employment 0.960 0.959 0.940 0.959
Net exports -0.610 -0.596 -0.606 -0.596
Cross-country correlations
Output 0.153 0.152 0.151 0.151
Consumption 0.783 0.714 0.833 0.805
Investment -0.367 -0.368 -0.488 -0.489
Employment -0.238 -0.245 -0.466 -0.473
Notes: With exception of the net exports ratio, statistics refer to logged and HP-filtered vari-
ables, with   = 1600 (see Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). Model variables are y for output, c
for consumption, i for investment, l for employment, and nx/y for the ratio of net exports to
output. Model results are computed by simulating the theoretical economy for 10,000 periods
starting from the deterministic steady state, and then discarding the first 1000 periods as a
burn-in. The column labeled “Data” presents a range of empirical estimates obtained from
existing literature. See the text for details.
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In Table 3.5 we present key moments and correlations obtained by simulating the
benchmark model for di↵erent values of j. In all simulations we use the baseline
calibration described in Table 3.1. We see that, overall, the results of the benchmark
model do not change with the value of j being used in the simulation. There are
some di↵erences across simulations in terms of the correlation between the exchange
rate and output, and in terms of the correlation between the exchange rate and the
net exports ratio, but the di↵erences are small and do not exhibit any meaningful
pattern. The stability of the results suggests that the findings discussed in Sections
3.4.2 and 3.4.3 are not dependent on a particular lag structure for the law of motion
of risk aversion. In particular, we confirm that, regardless of the value of j, the
benchmark model: (i) is unable to generate su cient volatility in the exchange rate;
(ii) decreases the magnitude of the Backus and Smith (1993) puzzle; and (iii) does
not eliminate the quantity anomaly.
In Figure 3.1 we provide further evidence that our key findings do not stem from a
particular lag structure for the law of motion of risk aversion. Each panel plots the
value of a simulated statistic for di↵erent values of j under two calibrations: the solid
line refers to the baseline calibration described in Table 3.1; the dashed line refers to
an alternative calibration in which risk aversion is twice as sensitive to fluctuations
in output (⇣ = 340). The leftmost top panel presents the relative volatility of the
exchange rate, and we see that regardless of the value of j, the countercyclical risk
aversion mechanism has little influence over this statistic. The other two top panels
present correlations between the exchange rate and output and the net exports ratio.
Although these correlations change slightly with the value of j, we see that the way
they relate to countercyclical risk aversion is independent of j. The bottom panels
of Figure 3.1 show that the contribution of countercyclical risk aversion to address
the Backus and Smith (1993) puzzle and the quantity anomaly (Backus et al., 1995)
is not dependent on a particular lag structure for equation (3.36). In the leftmost
panel we see that the correlation between the exchange rate and the consumption
ratio drops, regardless of the value of j. In the two rightmost panels we confirm that
countercyclical risk aversion does not help significantly in addressing the quantity
anomaly: when risk aversion becomes more strongly countercyclical, the cross-country
correlation in consumption decreases only slightly, and the cross-country correlation
in output exhibits no significant change.
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Table 3.5: The role of the risk aversion response lag
Risk aversion response lag
Variable k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 8
Real exchange rate
Standard deviation relative to out-
put
0.205 0.204 0.207 0.208 0.206
Autocorrelation 0.850 0.850 0.852 0.857 0.854
Correlations with the real exchange
rate
Output 0.445 0.467 0.461 0.461 0.470
Net exports -0.373 -0.360 -0.358 -0.363 -0.354
Relative consumption 0.564 0.561 0.559 0.538 0.561
Standard deviations relative to out-
put
Consumption 0.310 0.312 0.309 0.314 0.314
Investment 3.498 3.494 3.495 3.494 3.493
Employment 0.546 0.548 0.547 0.549 0.549
Net exports 0.217 0.204 0.212 0.204 0.200
Correlations with output
Consumption 0.679 0.682 0.679 0.676 0.681
Investment 0.949 0.950 0.949 0.950 0.950
Employment 0.960 0.960 0.960 0.959 0.959
Net exports -0.610 -0.597 -0.599 -0.601 -0.594
Cross-country correlations
Output 0.153 0.153 0.152 0.151 0.152
Consumption 0.783 0.782 0.787 0.786 0.786
Investment -0.367 -0.367 -0.367 -0.368 -0.368
Employment -0.238 -0.239 -0.240 -0.243 -0.240
Notes: With exception of the net exports ratio, statistics refer to logged and HP-filtered variables, with
  = 1600 (see Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). Model variables are y for output, c for consumption, i for in-
vestment, l for employment, and nx/y for the ratio of net exports to output. Model results are computed
by simulating the theoretical economy for 10,000 periods starting from the deterministic steady state,
and then discarding the first 1000 periods as a burn-in. The column labeled “Data” presents a range
empirical estimates obtained from existing literature. See text for details.
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Figure 3.1: Effects of countercyclical risk aversion under different
response lags
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3.5 Robustness
In this section we investigate whether the e↵ects of countercylical risk aversion
documented in Section 3.4 hold when we modify key assumptions about the behavior
of the representative household. More specifically, we analyze how the model
performs when we consider alternative specifications for the behavior of the risk
aversion parameter,  t, and for the utility kernel, U (ct, lt).
3.5.1 Asymmetric response of risk aversion
One important feature of the benchmark model is that, for reasonable range of
output fluctuations, downturns and expansions have almost symmetric e↵ects on
risk aversion: the increase in  t caused by a given drop in output is roughly equal,
in absolute terms, to the decrease in  t caused by an expansion in output of the
same magnitude. This straightforward assumption implies that the e↵ects of bad
economic conditions are as large, but in the opposite direction, as the e↵ects of good
economic conditions. We now move away from the specification laid out in equation
(3.4) and instead assume that the law of motion of  t is:
 t =   exp
 ⇣(yt 1 yt 2), (3.37)
where we set ⇣ = 15 as the baseline value to deliver a volatility of  t that is comparable
with the volatility obtained with the benchmark model (using equation 3.4 and the
baseline calibration presented in Table 3.1).
The di↵erence between the two specifications is apparent in Figure 3.2, which depicts
how risk aversion behaves in response to movements in output, here computed
around the steady state. The solid line shows the quasi-linear relationship between
movements in output and movements in risk aversion implied by the benchmark
version of the model. The dashed line shows the response of risk aversion under
the specification laid out in equation (3.37): the increase in  t during a contraction
is larger, in absolute terms, than the decrease in  t for an equally sized expansion.
This kind of asymmetric response of  t implies that households are more sensitive
to bad economic conditions than to good economic conditions. Evidence that
individuals react di↵erently to bad outcomes and good outcomes of similar size has
been documented by, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
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Figure 3.2: Risk aversion movements – benchmark model vs.
asymmetric response
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In Table 3.6, under “Asymmetric response of  t”, we present key moments and
correlations obtained by simulating the model with the new law of motion for  t.
To carry out a thorough comparison with the results of the benchmark model, we
present results for ⇣ = 15 (column “Low ⇣”), which delivers a volatility of  t similar
to that of the baseline case in Section 3.4, but also the results obtained when we
double the sensitivity of  t to fluctuations in output by setting ⇣ = 30 (column
“High ⇣”), thereby mirroring the analysis in Section 4. We see that the results
closely match those obtained with the benchmark version of the model. The di↵erent
response of  t to downturns and expansions does not significantly change the relative
volatility of the exchange rate, which is still ten times smaller than in the data and
relatively insensitive to how strongly countercyclical  t is. Similarly, the volatility of
the quantity variables (relative to output) is also largely una↵ected by how much
 t moves in response to output fluctuations, and the simulated statistics show no
systematic deviation from the ones yielded by the benchmark model.
We observe two small di↵erences in the correlation between the exchange rate and
the consumption ratio. First, for the same level of volatility in  t, the benchmark
model presents a smaller correlation than the one obtained under the asymmetric
response implied by equation (3.37). Second, the correlation is more sensitive to
how strongly countercyclical risk aversion is in the benchmark model: starting from
the baseline, doubling the sensitivity of  t to fluctuations in output decreases the
correlation between the exchange rate and the consumption ratio by 0.35, but only
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by 0.3 under the asymmetric behavior of  t. Nevertheless, the countercyclical risk
aversion embedded in our continues to play an important role in reducing the size of
the Backus and Smith (1993) puzzle.
3.5.2 GHH utility kernel
The benchmark version of our model uses a Cobb–Douglas utility kernel, but as
pointed out by Guvenen (2009) that implies that  and   simultaneously set the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the amount of time the household devotes to
work, and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. In this section we investigate whether
the results of our model hold when we move away from the Cobb-Douglas utility
kernel. More specifically, we follow Guvenen (2009) and adapt the utility kernel Ut
to the specification proposed by Greenwood et al. (1988):
U (ct, lt) =
✓
ct   ' l
1+ 
t
1 +  
◆
, (3.38)
where in line with Greenwood et al. (1988) we set   = 0.6, implying a Frisch elasticity
of labor supply close to 1.7, and we set ' so that the representative household devotes
one third of its time to work in the steady state. The new specification for the utility
kernel implies some changes to the equilibrium conditions and the steady state.2
In Table 3.6, under “GHH kernel”, we present key moments and correlations obtained
by simulating the model using the GHH utility kernel, and the original law of motion
for  t described in equation (3.4). Again, for a thorough comparison with the results
of the benchmark model we present results for the two levels of sensitivity of  t to
fluctuations in output studied in Section 3.4: ⇣ = 150 as in the baseline calibration of
Table 3.1 (column “Low ⇣”), and ⇣ = 300 for the case in which risk aversion is twice
as sensitive to output fluctuations (column “High ⇣”). Predictably, the change in the
utility kernel causes some significant changes in the results. Relative to output, the
exchange rate and investment become less volatile, and consumption and employment
become more volatile. Nevertheless, the e↵ects of countercyclical risk aversion are,
in general, very similar to those observed under a Cobb-Douglas utility kernel. The
relative volatility of the exchange rate raises only modestly when risk aversion is
more strongly countercyclical, and the relative volatility of all quantity variables
is largely unrelated to how large the fluctuations in  t are. Like in the benchmark
model, the correlation between the exchange rate and the consumption ratio is
2Detailed derivations are available upon request.
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well below 1 and very sensitive to how strongly countercyclical  t is. Furthermore,
fluctuations in risk aversion are still irrelevant to the cross-country correlation in
output, but do play a role in shaping the cross-country correlation of consumption,
which becomes lower when  t is more volatile. However, the results suggest that
introducing GHH preferences help the model address the quantity anomaly, as the
cross-country correlation is now larger for output than for consumption.
There are, however, meaningful di↵erences in the correlations between the exchange
rate and output, and between the exchange rate and net exports. Although the e↵ects
of countercyclical risk aversion are essentially the same as in the benchmark model,
under the GHH utility kernel they become much more pronounced: the correlation
between the exchange rate and output is cut in half when  t becomes twice as volatile,
whereas in the benchmark model the reduction is much more subdued; and the
correlation between the exchange rate and the net exports ratio now moves much
more closer to the empirical range when risk aversion becomes more volatile.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we used recursive preferences together with an endogenous risk aversion
parameter to introduce countercyclical risk aversion into an otherwise standard
two-country RBC model. With recursive preferences the behavior of the exchange
rate directly depends on the risk aversion of the Home and Foreign countries, and
thus is sensitive to how risk aversion moves along the business cycle. In our model
we assume that risk aversion increases when aggregate output decreases, and vice
versa. This setup builds an additional source of fluctuations into the dynamics of
the exchange rate, and modifies certain results of the standard two-country model.
Under reasonable assumptions for the volatility of the risk aversion parameter, we
find that this setup is still unable to generate su cient volatility for the exchange
rate, but it successfully reduces the magnitude of Backus and Smith (1993) puzzle:
the correlation between movements in the exchange rate and in the consumption
ratio is well below 1, and is highly sensitive to how strongly countercyclical risk
aversion is.
Our robustness checks indicate that the main results hold with di↵erent specifications
for the law of motion of the risk aversion parameter and for the period utility of the
households. The relatively small increase in the volatility of the exchange rate and
the significant reduction in the Backus and Smith (1993) puzzle are still present if
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we: (i) change the lag with which risk aversion reacts to fluctuations in output; (ii)
assume that increases in risk aversion during contractions are larger than decreases in
risk aversion during expansions; and (iii) move away from the Cobb-Douglas utility
and instead consider an utility kernel based on Greenwood et al. (1988).
Appendix
Derivation of the SDF
In equilibrium, the utility of a fractional unit of consumption in period t+ 1 must
be the same as the utility of that same that fractional unit of consumption in period
t, when properly discounted by the stochastic discount factor mt,t+1:
@Vt
@ct
mt,t+1⇠ =
@Vt
@ct+1
⇠, (3.39)
for ⇠ arbitrarily close to zero. We can apply the chain rule to the derivative on the
right hand side of (3.39) to obtain
@Vt
@ct
mt,t+1 =
@Vt
@Vt+1
@Vt+1
@ct+1
. (3.40)
First we di↵erentiate Vt with respect to ct to obtain
@Vt
@ct
= V  t (1   )U1  t c 1t  . (3.41)
Then we iterate this result forward one period:
@Vt+1
@ct+1
= V  t+1 (1   )U1  t+1 c 1t+1 , (3.42)
and finally we compute
@Vt
@Vt+1
= V  t  Et
 
V 1  tt+1
   t  
1  t V   tt+1 . (3.43)
If we substitute equations (3.41), (3.42), and (3.43) into equation (3.39) and re-arrange
terms, we obtain the stochastic discount factor for the Home country,
mt,t+1 =  
ct
ct+1
✓
Ut+1
Ut
◆1   V 1  tt+1
Et
 
V 1  tt+1
 !   t1  t . (3.44)
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Steady state
Let xss denote the steady state value of the variable xt. In the steady state the
bond holdings of the representative household are zero, and investment replaces the
depreciated capital, iss =  kss. From the budget constraint of the representative
household, we obtain
css +  kss = wsslss + rk,sskss. (3.45)
In the steady state, capital and labor are paid according to their respective marginal
productivities. We di↵erentiate (3.7) with respect to kt and lt to obtain the expressions
for the marginal productivity of capital and labor,
@yt
@kt
= ↵ expzt k↵ 1t l
1 ↵
t ,
@yt
@lt
= (1  ↵) expzt k↵t l ↵t .
The wage rate and the rental rate of capital in the steady state are then
wss = (1  ↵) k↵ssl ↵ss ⌘
@yt
@lt
    
Xt=Xss
, (3.46)
rk,ss = ↵k
↵ 1
ss l
1 ↵
ss ⌘
@yt
@kt
    
Xt=Xss
, (3.47)
where Xt is a vector containing all model variables, and Xss is a vector containing
the steady state values for Xt.3 since in the steady state zss = 0. Substituting (3.46)
and (3.47) into (3.45) and re-arranging terms yields.
css +  kss = k
↵
ssl
1 ↵
ss . (3.48)
Next, we use the Euler equation for capital to establish that in the steady state
kss
lss
=
✓
1
↵
✓
1
 
+     1
◆◆ 1
↵ 1
⌘ ⌦. (3.49)
Substituting this result into (3.48), re-arranging terms, and applying some algebraic
manipulation yields
css = lss (⌦
↵    ⌦) . (3.50)
3Recall that in the steady state zss = 0, and thus: (i) wss = (1  ↵) expzss k↵ssl ↵ss =
(1  ↵) k↵ssl ↵ss ; (ii)
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Note that the results (3.49) and (3.50) are independent from the preferences of the
representative household over the consumption-leisure bundle.
From the F.O.C. with respect to consumption and labor for the maximization problem
of the representative household, as described by equations (3.19) and (3.20), we
establish that in the steady state
 
1   wss =
css
1  lss .
Using this result together with (3.46) and (3.49) yields
css
1  lss =
 
1    (1  ↵)⌦
↵ ⌘  ,
which can be re-stated as
css = (1  lss) .
Substituting into (3.50) this result and re-arranging terms yields
lss =
 
⌦↵    ⌦+   . (3.51)
Finally, we substitute (3.51) into (3.49) to obtain
kss =
 ⌦
⌦↵    ⌦+   . (3.52)
From (3.51) and (3.52) it is straightforward to compute the steady state values for
the remaining variables.
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Chapter 4
Expectations and risk attitudes:
Evidence from a longitudinal
survey in Tshwane, South Africa
4.1 Introduction
Attitudes towards risk are considerably di↵erent across individuals, and economists
and psychologists have devoted a substantial amount of research to understanding
the origins of this heterogeneity. The interest stems from the important role that risk
and risk-taking play in everyday life. Individuals routinely make choices in contexts
that involve a trade-o↵ between safer and riskier options, and the choices they make
have consequences – for themselves, and sometimes for markets or society by virtue
of the aggregation of individual actions.
Several studies examine the importance of sociodemographic characteristics in ex-
plaining di↵erences in risk attitudes. The evidence presented by Dohmen et al. (2010)
and Dohmen et al. (2011) indicates that characteristics such as age, gender, marital
status, education and cognitive ability significantly predict the willingness to take
risks (see also Byrnes et al. (1999) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) for meta-analyses
of the role of gender, and Harbaugh et al. (2002) for further evidence on the role
of age). Other studies emphasize how di↵erences in risk attitudes may be partially
explained by genetic factors (see, e.g., Cesarini et al., 2009; Kuhnen and Chiao,
2009).
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A di↵erent strand of the literature investigates how the exposure to certain events
influences risk attitudes. One set of studies examines how risk attitudes react to
natural and man-made disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcano eruptions,
floods or radioactive contamination (see, e.g., Eckel et al., 2009; Cassar et al., 2011;
Willinger et al., 2013; Page et al., 2014; Cameron and Shah, 2015; Goebel et al., 2015;
Hanaoka et al., 2015). These studies commonly find that risk preferences change for
individuals who are exposed to such disasters. Similarly, other studies show that
exposure to conflict-related violence can also lead to changes in risk attitudes (see,
e.g., Voors et al., 2012; Callen et al., 2014; Kim and Lee, 2014). A di↵erent set of
studies examines how risk attitudes are influenced by macroeconomic shocks and
the macroeconomic environment to which individuals are exposed. Malmendier and
Nagel (2011) find that households who experience low stock market returns exhibit
a lower willingness to take financial risks. Guiso et al. (2013) analyze repeated
observations of a sample of Italian bank customers and conclude that they became
more risk averse after the 2008 financial crisis.
In this paper, we use data from a longitudinal survey conducted in the Tshwane
Municipality, South Africa, to investigate the relationship between risk attitudes and
expectations about the future. Expectations, much like actual experiences, evoke
emotions such as excitement, fear, or anxiety. Studies in the field of neuroscience show
that two brain areas that process risk – the nucleus accumbens and the anterior insula
(Preuscho↵ et al., 2006) – are also associated with the processing of emotions: positive
emotions activate the nucleus accumbens (see, e.g., Bjork et al., 2004), and negative
emotions activate the anterior insula (see, e.g. Chua et al., 1999; Simmons et al., 2004,
2006). The activation of these areas has been shown to modify risk attitudes and
predict behavior in controlled experiments (see, e.g., Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005), and
more recently Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) have suggested that two specific emotions
– excitement and anxiety – influence the risk attitudes of individuals. Furthermore,
some studies have shown that cortisol, a stress-related hormone, can modulate risk
attitudes both in a laboratory setting (see, e.g., Kandasamy et al., 2014) and in the
field (see, e.g., Coates and Herbert, 2008). Thus, by evoking emotional states that
activate specific brain areas or trigger hormonal responses, expectations may indeed
be an important determinant of risk attitudes.
We concentrate on two di↵erent types of expectations. First, we examine the role
of expectations that individuals have about the economic environment of their
communities. This is relevant because people in our sample face a paucity of wage
work, and they often resort to running small (sometime informal) businesses to earn
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their income. If, for example, worse economic expectations reduce the willingness to
take risks, this can accentuate the negative e↵ects of an economic slowdown: not
only the anticipation of negative economic conditions reduces the attractiveness and
availability of business opportunities, but at the same time individuals also become
less willing to take on the risks associated with existing business opportunities.
Second, we examine the role of expectations that individuals have about their own
health. This is relevant because people in our sample face a large variance in disease
prevalence, including HIV, with varying current and future consequences. If, for
example, better health expectations increase the willingness to take risks, policies
that improve the health conditions and health expectations of individuals may also
have ramifications for everyday decisions that individuals make in contexts where
risk is an important factor.
We find that economic expectations significantly predict the willingness to take risks.
According to our estimates, an increase in economic expectations by an amount
equal to its average within-respondent standard deviation is associated with an
increase in the willingness to take risks of about 4% of its average within-respondent
standard deviation. In our data almost two-thirds of our respondents exhibit shifts
in their economic expectations, and for about 20% of the respondents our estimates
would imply shifts in the willingness to take risks that are as large as 25% of its
average within-respondent standard deviation. We also find some evidence that
health expectations significantly predict the willingness to take risks, with better
health expectations being associated with a higher willingness to take risks. An
increase in health expectations by an amount equal to its average within-respondent
standard deviation is associated with an increase in the willingness to take risks of
about 3% of its average within-respondent standard deviation. However, while the
results relating to economic expectations hold under a variety of robustness checks,
the results regarding health expectations do not.
Our estimations control for a set of sociodemographic characteristics of the respon-
dents such as age, education, marital status, education, wealth, life satisfaction, many
of which have been shown to predict risk attitudes. In some cases we successfully
replicate the findings of previous studies. For example, we find a higher willingness
to take risks among those who are married or living together with their spouses, and
among those who report a higher life satisfaction, in line with the results of Dohmen
et al. (2011). We find a quadratic relationship between age and risk attitudes, with
the estimates implying that the willingness to take risks is increasing with with
age for those younger than 64 years, and decreasing with with age for those older
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than 64 years. In contrast with other studies, in our sample the educational level,
health conditions, or wealth of the respondents does not significantly predict their
willingness to take risks.
Because a large proportion of respondents in our sample reports owning a business,
we also examine whether the relationship between economic expectations and the
willingness to take risks is di↵erent for business owners and non-owners. There are
two reasons that lead us to consider such possibility. First, business owners may have
more complete information about the economic environment of their communities,
and this may make their economics expectations systematically di↵erent from the
expectations of non-owners. Second, business owners may also be intrinsically
di↵erent with respect to their willingness to take risks, as higher risk tolerance has
been found to be positively related with entrepreneurial activity (see, e.g., Van Praag
and Cramer, 2001; Cramer et al., 2002; Hartog et al., 2002; Ekelund et al., 2005; Kan
and Tsai, 2006; Caliendo et al., 2009). Our results, however, provide no evidence of
a statistically significant di↵erence between business owners and non-owners in terms
of the relationship between economic expectations and the willingness to take risks.
This conclusion holds in a specification in which the dummy variable that indicates
the business owner status is interacted with only the expectations term, and also
in a specification in which the business owner dummy is fully interacted with the
remaining covariates.
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we expand the body of evidence
related to the determinants of risk attitudes. Our results indicate that economic
expectations are a significant predictor of the willingness to take risks, and they
suggest the possibility that health expectations may also play a role in determining
risk attitudes. Our results also provide further evidence that age, marital status
and life satisfaction significantly predict risk attitudes. Second, our results are also
relevant to the debate about the stability of risk attitudes over time. A series of
recent studies has suggested that risk preferences may have a time-varying component
(Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Cohn et al., 2015), and our
results on the relationship between economic expectations and the willingness to
take risks suggest a possible explanation for its presence. According to our findings,
shifts in economic expectations are associated with shifts in risk attitudes. As
economies experience the short-term fluctuations associated with the business cycle,
the economic expectations of individuals are naturally subject to changes, and this
causes risk attitudes to fluctuate over time. Finally, the results of our study are also
relevant for policymakers because they highlight how decision making under risk may
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be a↵ected by policies that shift people’s expectations. We provide some examples
that are directly relevant for the respondents in our sample, and also discuss potential
implications for our understanding of asset price bubbles, conditional on the external
validity of our study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe the empirical
framework and data used in the study. In Section 4.3 we present the results of
our main statistical analysis, and we perform a robustness analysis in Section 4.4.
In Section 4.5 we discuss our results and their policy implications, as well as the
limitations of our study. We close with some concluding remarks in Section 4.6.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Sample
Our study uses a sample of 2680 individuals who were interviewed as part of a
three-wave longitudinal survey conducted in the Tshwane Municipality, South Africa,
between 2009 and 2014. Respondents were selected from predominantly African areas
according to the sampling procedure described in Chao et al. (2012). The first wave
of the survey consisted of a census of the enumeration areas selected for sampling,
and respondents answered a short questionnaire that elicited information about
their sociodemographic characteristics, health status, business activities, and the
composition of their households. The second and third waves of the study revisited the
respondents interviewed during the first wave, this time with a more comprehensive
questionnaire. The extended questionnaire included additional questions about the
sociodemographic and psychological characteristics of the respondents, their health
status, their attitudes and beliefs about health risks and HIV stigma, and more
details of their business activities. In all waves we asked respondents a set of questions
related to their risk attitudes and economic and health expectations.
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4.2.2 Dependent variables
The main dependent variable in our study is a 5-point scale of risk attitudes. More
specifically, we asked respondents to rate their willingness to take risks using the
following question:
“Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you
generally always try to avoid taking risks?
1–Do everything to avoid risks;
5–Fully prepared to take risks”.
This question is similar to a question used by Dohmen et al. (2011) to elicit general
risk attitudes, except theirs is an 11-point scale. In the second and third waves of
our study, we also asked respondents to rate their willingness to take risks using an
11-point version of the question presented above. We use this additional data to
perform robustness checks of our main results, and to provide some comparability
between our study and other studies that use the 11-point scale to examine risk
attitudes.
4.2.3 Main independent variables
The main independent variables in our study are two 5-point measures of economic
and health expectations. We asked respondents about their expectations for the
economic environment of their communities using the following question:
“What do you think the overall economic environment in your community
will be like in one year from today? Do you think the overall economic
environment will:
1–Decline a lot;
2–Decline a little;
3–Remain the same;
4–Improve a little;
5–Improve a lot.”
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We then asked respondents about their expectations for their own health by asking:
“Please think realistically before answering this question. Do you think
your health next year will be:
1–Much worse than today;
2–Worse than today;
3–Same as today;
4–Better than today;
5–Much better than today.”
It is important to contrast the scope of our measures of expectations with the scope
of our measures of risk attitudes. Our questions about expectations relate to two
specific domains: the economic environment of our respondents’ communities, and
our respondents’ own health. On the other hand, our questions about risk attitudes
refer to the willingness to take risks in general, not in terms of economic risks
or health risks in particular. The availability of data dictates this di↵erence, as
the survey administered to our respondents did not include questions about the
willingness to take economic risks or health risks in particular. Because our aim is to
investigate the e↵ects of expectations on the willingness to take risks, it is important
to consider the potential implications of this di↵erence in the scope of the variables.
Let us first consider a hypothetical scenario in which risk attitudes in di↵erent domains
reflect mostly an individual’s core risk attitudes – there is a correlation between
measures of risk attitudes across di↵erent domains, and also between measures of
risk attitudes in general and measures of domain-specific risk attitudes. Recent work
by Dohmen et al. (2011) and Einav et al. (2012) presents evidence consistent with
this scenario. How would this a↵ect our ability to examine the potential relationship
between expectations and risk attitudes? Suppose that expectations pertaining to
a specific domain influence risk attitudes only in that same domain. For example,
economic expectations influence the willingness to take economic risks, but not the
willingness to take other types of risks. For this to be possible, the e↵ect of economic
expectations on the willingness to take economic risks would need to operate without
a↵ecting the individual’s core risk attitudes, and economic expectations would not
influence measures of risk attitudes in general. In this case, it is unlikely that we
would detect such an e↵ect with the data available for our study.
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Now suppose instead that expectations pertaining to a specific domain influence risk
attitudes in other domains as well. For example, suppose that economic expectations
influence the willingness to take economic risks, health risks, and other types of risks.
A plausible situation would be for economic expectations to influence an individual’s
core risk attitudes, and this would then influence risk attitudes in other domains.1 In
this case economic expectations would influence measures of risk attitudes in general,
and we might be able to detect such an e↵ect with the data available for our study.
Let us now consider an alternative scenario in which risk attitudes are mostly
domain-specific and a common core of risk attitudes is absent – there is little to
no correlation between measures of risk attitudes across di↵erent domains, and also
between measures of risk attitudes in general and measures of domain-specific risk
attitudes. Barseghyan et al. (2011) present evidence consistent with this scenario.
Expectations pertaining to a specific domain may influence risk attitudes in that
domain, but are unlikely to influence risk attitudes in other domains (otherwise risk
attitudes across domains would be correlated), and also unlikely to a↵ect measures
of risk attitudes in general. In this case, we might not be able to detect such an
e↵ect with the data available for our study.
4.2.4 Other independent variables
Our study includes a set of additional variables that relate to the respondents’
sociodemographic characteristics. Age has been shown to be a significant predictor
of risk attitudes (see, e.g., P˚alsson, 1996; Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001; Dohmen et al.,
2011), and in our regressions we control for the age of the respondent with a linear
and a quadratic term. We also control for the current physical and mental health
of the respondents using two measures derived from the SF-12 health instrument
(Ware et al., 1995). The health measures allow us to address two potential sources of
bias in our estimations. First, those with poor physical health may have a di↵erent
willingness to take risks (see, e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011), and they may also have
di↵erent expectations about their health in the future. Second, those in poor mental
health may form expectations that are systematically di↵erent from the expectations
of respondents in good mental health, and at the same time they might also report a
systematically di↵erent willingness to take risks.
1An alternative in which core risk attitudes remain unchanged and all the e↵ect operates strictly
on the non-shared portion of the variance of several unrelated domain-specific risk attitudes seems
unlikely.
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We control for education using a categorical variable that classifies our respondents
into those who: (i) have some primary education or less; (ii) completed primary
education; (iii) have some secondary education; (iv) completed secondary education,
and; (v) have at least some tertiary education. Education can be a confounding
variable in two ways. First, better educated people may hold systematically di↵erent
expectations about the future economic conditions in their community or about
their own health, and at the same time they may be intrinsically di↵erent in their
willingness to take risks. In the literature the evidence on the relationship between
education and risk attitudes is mixed, as some studies have found education to
be positively related with higher risk tolerance (see, e.g., Miyata, 2002; Hryshko
et al., 2011) and others have found education to be negatively related with higher
risk tolerance (see, e.g., Tanaka et al., 2010). Second, higher levels of education
have been found to be associated with better health outcomes and lower risk of
health problems (see Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2008) for a comprehensive review of
available evidence), and the health expectations of better educated individuals may
also be systematically di↵erent from the expectations of those with less education.
We also control for the respondent’s wealth as evidence available from some studies
indicates that risk aversion is negatively related to wealth (see, e.g., Halek and
Eisenhauer, 2001; Guiso and Paiella, 2008). We construct a wealth index based on
whether the respondent’s household has access to a set of eight items: a cell phone, a
computer, a landline telephone, a microwave, a radio, a refrigerator, a television, and
a washing machine. For each item we create a dummy variable that takes the value
1 if the respondent’s household has access to that item, and the value 0 otherwise.
We then perform a principal component analysis with the dummy variables and take
the first principal component as our wealth index.
We also include variables for marital status and life satisfaction, both of which
have been shown to predict risk attitudes. Marital status is a dummy variable
that indicates if the respondent is married or living together. Life satisfaction is
measured on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating that the respondent is completely
dissatisfied with her life, and 100 indicating that the respondent is completely satisfied
with her life.
4.2.5 Model and estimation framework
We estimate a linear relationship between an individual’s willingness to take risks,
WTRi,t, and his expectations about the economic environment of his community,
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Ei,t [Yt+1], and about his own health, Ei,t [Hi,t+1]:
WTRi,t =  0 +  1Ei,t [Yt+1] +  2Ei,t [Hi,t+1] +  Xi,t + ⌫i + "i,t. (4.1)
Here   is a vector of coe cients associated with the vectorXi,t of additional covariates,
⌫i is an individual-specific fixed e↵ect, and "i,t is an error term. In the context of our
study, accommodating the presence of individual-specific fixed e↵ects is important
because non-observable traits may simultaneously a↵ect the willingness to take risks
and the expectations variables. Consider, for example, someone who is intrinsically
optimistic. This individual might downplay the negative consequences of risky
choices and therefore report a higher willingness to take risks. At the same time,
this individual may have a more rosy view of the future that translates into more
positive expectations. The use of fixed e↵ects estimation allows us to tackle this
issue and deal with potential omitted variable bias problems.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the willingness to take risks, economic and
health expectations, and other explanatory variables used in our study. Our panel is
unbalanced, with almost all of the 2680 respondents having data in the first wave,
but about 38% of them not being present in at least one of the subsequent waves.2
On average, the respondents in our sample are slightly over 40 years old, around
40% of them have completed at least secondary education, and almost half of them
are married or living together with their spouses. The average physical health of
our respondents, as measured by the SF12 instrument, remains essentially the same
across the three waves of the survey, but the average mental health exhibits a small
(statistically non-significant) increase over time. Around one third of the respondents
reports owning a business, which in many cases is operated by the business owner
alone. A small fraction of the respondents relocates within the enumeration areas
2The di↵erence in the number of observations across waves is caused by survey attrition and
non-response to the questions used in this study. For about 20% of the respondents in our sample
we have data in the first two waves, but not in the third wave. For about 14% of the respondents we
have data in the first and third waves, but not in the second wave. For about 4% of the respondents
we only have data in the first wave.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for the willingness to take risks,
economic and health expectations, and sociodemographic
characteristics
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Willingness to take risks
5-point scale 2.98 1.64 3.25 1.51 3.53 1.51
11-point scale - - 5.65 3.74 6.34 3.73
Economic expectations 3.81 0.93 3.45 1.03 3.44 1.14
Health expectations 3.84 0.86 3.81 0.88 3.68 0.86
Age 41.37 14.99 42.78 14.35 44.79 14.70
Education
Less than primary
schooling
0.18 0.39 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.36
Primary schooling com-
pleted
0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23
Some secondary school-
ing
0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48
Secondary schooling
completed
0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43
Above secondary
schooling
0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.38
Married or cohabiting 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50
Business owner 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47
Physical health 50.00 9.23 50.71 8.45 52.59 7.61
Mental health 46.40 10.00 49.42 10.69 51.32 9.44
Wealth index 0.00 1.50 0.00 1.52 0.00 1.53
Life satisfaction 60.79 26.19 53.80 25.82 58.93 26.40
Relocated - - 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25
Male 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49
Observations 2632 2191 2034
Notes: The table reports weighted means and standard deviations.
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covered by our survey. About 5% of those interviewed during the second wave had
moved since our first interview, and about 7% of those interviewed during the third
wave had moved since we last interviewed them. These relocation rates do not
include respondents who have moved to places outside our enumeration areas, and
who we did not interview in the second and third waves.
The mean of the willingness to take risks measured on a 5-point scale ranges from
2.98 in the first wave to 3.53 in the third wave, but the respondents in our sample
cannot be generically described as having relatively neutral attitudes toward risk.
Although across all waves 20% of our respondents rate their willingness to take risks
as a 3 on the 5-point scale, 58% use one of the two extremes of the scale to describe
their attitudes towards risk (i.e., they chose either “1–Do everything possible to avoid
all risks” or “5–Fully prepared to take risks” as their answer to the risk attitudes
question).
Our respondents have mostly positive expectations about the economic environment
in their communities and about their own health. The mean of the economic
expectations measured on a 5-point scale ranges from 3.44 in the third wave to
3.81 in the first wave, with 58% of the respondents (across all waves) expecting an
improvement in the economic environment of their community, and 28% expecting
the economic environment to remain the same. In terms of health expectations our
respondents are equally optimistic: 63% expect their health to improve, and less
than 6% expect their health to deteriorate. As a result, the mean health expectations
measured on a 5-point scale ranges from 3.68 in the third wave to 3.84 in the first
wave.
Table 4.2 presents the mean willingness to take risks conditional on the economic
expectations of the respondent. In general, respondents who have better economic
expectations are more willing to take risks, with the Spearman rank correlation
between the two variables being 0.078 in the first wave, 0.167 in the second wave,
and 0.140 in the third wave (all correlations statistically significant, p < 0.001). Pair-
wise comparisons between respondents with di↵erent economic expectations reveal
statistically significant di↵erences in their willingness to take risks. As presented in
Table 4.2, Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the respondents with positive economic
expectations are more willing to take risks than the respondents who have neutral or
negative economic expectations. Interestingly, the tests also point to a statistically
significant di↵erence between those who expect the economic environment to improve
a lot and those who expect it to improve a little.
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Table 4.2: Mean willingness to take risks, by economic expectations
of the respondents
The overall economic environment in my community will...
(a)
Decline a
lot
(b)
Decline a
little
(c)
Remain
the same
(d)
Improve a
little
(e)
Improve a
lot
Willingness
to take
risks
Wave 1
2.79 2.95 2.84e 2.94e 3.21c,d
[2.33; 3.26] [2.66; 3.25] [2.72; 2.96] [2.84; 3.03] [3.09; 3.34]
Wave 2
2.78d,e 3.02d,e 3.06d,e 3.35a,b,c,e 3.75a,b,c,d
[2.47; 3.08] [2.84; 3.21] [2.94; 3.17] [3.25; 3.45] [3.60; 3.91]
Wave 3
3.15d,e 3.37e 3.37e 3.59a,e 3.95a,b,c,d
[2.90; 3.4] [3.17; 3.58] [3.24; 3.50] [3.49; 3.69] [3.80; 4.09]
Notes: The table reports means and 95% confidence intervals (in brackets) for the willingness to
take risks, conditional on the economic expectations of the respondents. The willingness to take
risks is measured on a 5-point scale, with 1 indicating the lowest willingness to take risks, and 5
indicating the highest willingness to take risks. Within each wave, superscripts denote a statistically
significant di↵erence in a Mann-Whitney test relative to the column indicated by the superscript
(Bonferroni corrected ↵ = 0.005). The number of observations is 2632 for Wave 1, 2191 for Wave 2,
and 2034 for Wave 3.
Table 4.3: Mean willingness to take risks, by health expectations of
the respondents
My health next year will be...
(a) Much
worse
than
today
(b) Worse
than
today
(c) Same
as today
(d) Better
than
today
(e) Much
better
than
today
Willingness
to take
risks
Wave 1
3.35 2.49d,e 2.67d,e 3.00b,c,e 3.39b,c,d
[2.25; 4.46] [2.22; 2.77] [2.55; 2.78] [2.90; 3.10] [3.27; 3.52]
Wave 2
2.12c,d,e 2.47c,d,e 3.25a,b 3.26a,b,e 3.47a,b,d
[1.43; 2.8] [2.20; 2.74] [3.13; 3.37] [3.16; 3.35] [3.34; 3.61]
Wave 3
2.81 2.78c,d,e 3.38b,e,f 3.67b,c,e 3.81
[1.29; 4.34] [2.48; 3.07] [3.27; 3.49] [3.57; 3.78] [3.67; 3.95]
Notes: The table reports means and 95% confidence intervals (in brackets) for the willingness
to take risks, conditional on the health expectations of the respondents. The willingness to take
risks is measured on a 5-point scale, with 1 indicating the lowest willingness to take risks, and 5
indicating the highest willingness to take risks. Within each wave, superscripts denote a statistically
significant di↵erence in a Mann-Whitney test relative to the column indicated by the superscript
(Bonferroni corrected ↵ = 0.005). The number of observations is 2632 for Wave 1, 2191 for Wave 2,
and 2034 for Wave 3.
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A similar picture emerges from Table 4.3, which presents the mean willingness to take
risks conditional on the health expectations of the respondents. Those with better
health expectations are on average more willing to take risks, with the Spearman
rank correlation between the two variables being 0.169 in the first wave, 0.108 in the
second wave, and 0.147 in the third wave (all correlations statistically significant,
p < 0.001). Again, Mann-Whitney tests show statistically significant di↵erences: (i)
between those with positive expectations and those with negative expectations; (ii)
among the two groups with positive expectations; and (iii) those who expect their
health to remain the same and those who expect their health to deteriorate. This
last di↵erence is mostly visible in the data from waves 2 and 3.
4.3.2 Regression analysis
4.3.2.1 The e↵ects of economic and health expectations
The conditional means presented in the previous section suggest that better economic
and health expectations are associated with a higher willingness to take risks. We now
turn to regression analysis to examine whether this result holds when we control for a
set of covariates that may a↵ect the willingness to take risks and also an individual’s
expectations. In Table 4.4 we present the main regression results from fixed e↵ects
estimation of the model described in equation 4.1 (the complete regression results
are provided in the Appendix, in Table A.1).3 All the empirical specifications include
economic expectations and health expectations as explanatory variables for the
willingness to take risks. In column (1) we include as additional covariates a set of
dummy variables to indicate the survey wave, which we use to control for potential
time-variant e↵ects that might be present for all respondents. In column (2) we
expand the baseline specification by also including variables for the respondents’ age,
education, marital status, physical and mental health, wealth, and life satisfaction.
The results shows that economic and health expectations significantly predict the
willingness to take risk, and in both cases better expectations are associated with a
higher willingness to take risk. For economic expectations, the estimated coe cient
(0.059, column 2) implies that a change in expectations proportional to their average
within-respondent standard deviation is associated with an increase in the willingness
3For the sake of completeness, in Appendix Table A.2 we present results from pooled OLS and
ordered logit regressions. While these regression setups do not account for time-invariant individual
heterogeneity that can potentially be correlated with our explanatory variables, the results are
consistent with those obtained in our main analysis.
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Table 4.4: The effects of economic and health expectations on the
willingness to take risks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic expectations 0.062*** 0.059** 0.059** 0.108***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.033)
Health expectations 0.070** 0.062** 0.060* 0.043
(0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.042)
Business owner 0.088
(0.777)
Business owner x Economic expectations -0.002
(0.049)
Relocated -2.773
(5.231)
Relocated x Economic expectations 0.032
(0.153)
Relocated x Health expectations 0.113
(0.200)
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6857 6857 6857 4225
R2 0.044 0.051 0.055 0.055
F -statistic 41.22 13.50 7.24 4.55
P(F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports coe cient estimates and clustered standard errors (in parentheses) from
fixed e↵ects regressions. The dependent variable is the willingness to take risks measured on a
5-point scale, with 1 indicating the lowest willingness to take risks, and 5 indicating the highest
willingness to take risks. Economic and health expectations are measured on 5-point scales, with 1
indicating the most negative expectations, and 5 indicating the most positive expectations (see the
text for details). Sociodemographic controls include variables for age, education, marital status,
physical and mental health, wealth, and life satisfaction. Asterisks denote statistical significance:
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
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to take risks of 4.2% of its average within-respondent standard deviation. Going
from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile of economic expectations implies a
di↵erence in the willingness to take risks of 0.18 units. This di↵erence corresponds
to about 11% of the unconditional standard deviation of the willingness to take risks.
The results for health expectations are similar, but in general the magnitude of the
e↵ect is smaller. The estimated coe cient (0.062, column 2) implies that a change
in health expectations proportional to their average within-respondent standard
deviation is associated with an increase in the willingness to take risks of 3.2% of its
average within-respondent standard deviation. Going from the 10th percentile to
the 90th percentile of health expectations implies a di↵erence in the willingness to
take risks of 0.12 units on the 5-point scale, which corresponds to about 7% of the
unconditional standard deviation of the willingness to take risks.
4.3.2.2 Other determinants of risk attitudes
As documented in Appendix Table A.1, we find evidence of a relationship between age
and the willingness to take risks, with both the linear and the quadratic terms being
statistically significant. The coe cient estimates (b age = 0.117; b age2 =  0.0091)
imply that the willingness to take risks increases with age for those younger than 64,
and decreases with age for those older than 64. The literature usually documents a
negative relationship between age and the willingness to take risks (see, e.g., P˚alsson,
1996; Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001; Dohmen et al., 2011), but in many cases the
estimated specifications do not include a quadratic term on age. We also find that
both marital status and life satisfaction significantly predict the willingness to take
risks. Those who are married or living together with their spouse are more willing to
take risks, and so are those who are more satisfied with their lives. Similar findings
regarding marital status and life satisfaction have also been documented by, e.g.,
Dohmen et al. (2011). We find no evidence of statistically significant e↵ects related
to the education or wealth of the respondents.
4.3.2.3 The e↵ects of business ownership and relocation
Because a substantial proportion of our respondents reports owning a business, we
also examine whether business owners are di↵erent from non-owners in the way their
willingness to take risks responds to changes in expectations. Column (3) of Table
4.4 presents estimation results for a specification similar to that of column (2), but in
85
which all explanatory variables are interacted with a dummy variable that indicates
business ownership. The results suggest that business owners are not di↵erent from
non-owners: the coe cients on the interaction terms that relate to economic and
health expectations are negative but very small (-0.002 and -0.009, respectively),
and they are not statistically significant at the 5% level. The main e↵ects retain the
original magnitude, with the coe cient on economic expectations being statistically
significant with p < 0.05, but the coe cient on health expectations being statistically
significant only with p < 0.1.4
We then examine whether the e↵ects of economic and health expectations are
di↵erent for people who relocate in the periods of time between any two of our
interviews. On one hand, those who decide to move may be intrinsically di↵erent
in their willingness to take risks. On the other hand, those who move may end up
in areas that are substantially di↵erent from their original area in terms of living
conditions or economic opportunities, and this may influence their economic and
health expectations. Column (4) of Table 4.4 presents estimation results for a
specification similar to that of column (2), but in which all explanatory variables are
interacted with a dummy variable that indicates that the respondent has relocated.
Because we are only able to detect relocations in the second and third waves of our
survey our estimation does not include data from wave 1, hence the smaller number
of observations in the panel used for the regression of column 4. The results show no
evidence of a di↵erence between those who relocate and those who do not, as the
coe cients on the interaction terms that relate to economic and health expectations
are not statistically significant.5
The estimates for the main e↵ects, however, are considerably di↵erent from the ones
obtained the other regressions. The coe cient on the economic expectations is almost
twice as large as before and statistically significant, and the coe cient on health
expectations becomes somewhat smaller and is no longer statistically significant at
the 5% level. The di↵erences are not due to estimating this particular specification,
but instead result from the fact that we run the estimation on data from the second
and third waves. In fact, re-estimating the model of column (2) with that same data
yields coe cients for the economic and health expectations that are very close to the
ones reported in column (4) for the main e↵ects: 0.110 for the economic expectations
(p = 0.001), and 0.052 for the health expectations (p = 0.213). This suggests that
4We obtain similar results with a specification in which the dummy variable that indicates
business ownership is interacted only with the expectations variables.
5Again, the results hold with a specification in which the dummy variable that indicates relocation
is interacted only with the expectations variables.
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in the second and third waves of our study the e↵ects of economic expectations are
more pronounced, and the e↵ects of health expectations less pronounced.
4.4 Robustness
4.4.1 Measurement of risk attitudes
The results presented in Table 4.4 are from regressions in which the dependent
variable is a 5-point measure of the willingness to take risks. In the literature other
scales are sometimes used to measure risk attitudes. Some examples are the 11-point
scale used by Dohmen et al. (2010) and Dohmen et al. (2011), or the 4-point scale
used by Malmendier and Nagel (2011). Scales with a large number of points allow
for a more precise characterization of individual risk attitudes and create room for
a better measurement of the true variance of risk attitudes that exists in a sample
or population. Scales with a smaller number of points aggregate individuals who
would rank di↵erently in a scale with a larger number of points, and this may either
exaggerate or attenuate di↵erences that exist between any two individuals. For this
reason it is important to ask whether the results we have presented so far hold when
we use a di↵erent scale to measure the willingness to take risks.
In the second and third waves we measured the risk attitudes of our respondents
twice, once using a 5-point scale and once using an 11-point scale. The two questions
were administered separately at di↵erent points of the interview, and the ordering of
the questions was randomized for each respondent. In the first column of Table 4.5,
we present results from fixed e↵ects estimation of equation 4.1 using the 11-point
measure of the willingness to take risks as the dependent variable. The data for
the regressions excludes the first wave of the survey because the 11-point measure
is not available for that wave. For comparison purposes, we then use the same
sub-sample to estimate a regression in which the dependent variable is our original
5-point measure. We present those results in the second column of Table 4.5.
The conclusions are essentially the same for the two measures of the willingness to
take risks. We find that economic expectations significantly predict the willingness
to take risks, but health expectations do not. For economic expectations the e↵ect
sizes are equivalent across the two measures of the willingness to take risks. First,
the size of the coe cient estimates relative to the size of the scale is similar across
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Table 4.5: The effects of economic and health expectations on the
willingness to take risks, measured on different scales
DV: Willingness to take risks
11-point scale 5-point scale
Economic expectations 0.225*** 0.110***
(0.079) (0.033)
Health expectations 0.013 0.052
(0.101) (0.042)
Wave dummies Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes
Observations 4225 4225
R2 0.042 0.044
F -statistic 5.28 5.56
P(F -statistic) 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports coe cient estimates and clustered standard errors (in parentheses) from
fixed e↵ects regressions. The dependent variables is the willingness to take risks, measured on
an 11-point scale in the first column, and measured on a 5-point scale in the second column. In
both cases 1 indicates the lowest willingness to take risks, and the highest number on the scale
indicates the highest willingness to take risks. Economic and health expectations are measured
on 5-point scales, with 1 indicating the most negative expectations, and 5 indicating the most
positive expectations (see the text for details). Sociodemographic controls include variables for
age, education, marital status, physical and mental health, wealth, and life satisfaction. Asterisks
denote statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
our two measures of risk attitudes. In the first column Table 4.5 the estimated
coe cient ( ˆ1 = 0.225, p < 0.001) implies that a one-unit increase in the measure of
economic expectations is associated with an increase of 0.225 points in the measure
of risk attitudes. This corresponds to 0.225/11 = 2.05% of the number of points on
the 11-point scale of risk attitudes. In the second column the estimated coe cient
( ˆ1 = 0.110, p < 0.001) implies that a one-unit increase in the measure of economic
expectations is associated with an increase of 0.11 points in the 5-point measure of
risk attitudes. This corresponds to 0.110/5 = 2.2% of the number of points on the
scale of risk attitudes.
Second, we estimate that an increase in economic expectations by an amount equal
to its average within-respondent standard deviation is associated with increases in
the willingness to take risks that are similar across the two measurement scales.
On the 11-point scale the increase is about 7.3% of the average within-respondent
standard deviation observed for that scale. On the 5-point scale the increase is about
8.9% of the average within-respondent standard deviation observed for that scale.
Finally, going from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile of economic expectations
is also associated with increases in the willingness to take risks that are similar across
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Table 4.6: The effects of economic and health expectations on the
willingness to take risks, balanced panel results
Balanced sub-panel Unbalanced panel
Economic expectations 0.062** 0.059**
(0.026) (0.023)
Health expectations 0.058* 0.062**
(0.031) (0.028)
Observations 4872 6857
R2 0.057 0.051
F -statistic 11.48 13.50
P(F -statistic) 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports coe cient estimates and clustered standard errors (in parentheses) from
fixed e↵ects regressions. The dependent variables are the willingness to take risks, measured on a
11-point scale (first column) or on a 5-point scale (second column), with 1 indicating the lowest
willingness to take risks, and 5 indicating the highest willingness to take risks. Economic and health
expectations are measured on 5-point scales, with 1 indicating the most negative expectations, and
5 indicating the most positive expectations (see the text for details). Sociodemographic controls
include variables for age, education, marital status, physical and mental health, wealth, and life
satisfaction. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
the two measurement scales. On the 11-point scale the increase corresponds to
about 33.7% of the average within-respondent standard deviation observed in our
sample. On the 5-point scale the increase corresponds to about 30.7% of the average
within-respondent standard deviation observed in our sample.
4.4.2 Survey attrition and non-response
The results we have presented so far are from fixed e↵ects regressions on the un-
balanced panel. As we have mentioned in Section 4.3, some of the respondents
interviewed in the first wave of the survey were not re-interviewed in subsequent
waves, and other respondents did not provide answers to some of the questions asked
by our interviewers. In such cases the observations are either missing or have to
be excluded from the analysis, leading to a sample selection problem that takes on
two forms: (i) attrition, when the respondent completely drops out of the panel;
and (ii) a form of incidental truncation, when certain variables are not observed in
some periods. Both issues can be safely ignored if they are entirely random, as fixed
e↵ects estimation on the unbalanced panel is robust to random sample selection
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 579). But if the sample selection is related to the dependent
variable (i.e., correlated with the errors "i,t in equation 4.1) we may face a problem
of biased coe cient estimates (Hausman and Wise, 1979).
While we should be concerned that sample selection issues might a↵ect our estimates,
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there are reasons to believe that the potential bias is likely to be small. Alderman et al.
(2001), for example, find that coe cient estimates are not significantly a↵ected by
attrition in three longitudinal studies from developing countries, even with attrition
rates in excess of 30% between survey waves.6 The incidence of attrition in our study
is substantially smaller. From the respondents interviewed in the first wave, less
than 5% are completely absent from the second and third waves, and about 20% are
present in the second wave but absent in the third wave.
We perform a series of statistical tests to check if sample selection is indeed a problem
in our data. We first test for the e↵ects of attrition using the method proposed by
Becketti et al. (1988). We regress the value of our dependent variable in the first
wave, WTRi,1, on: (i) the explanatory variables in the first wave; (ii) a dummy
variable zi that takes the value 1 if the respondent subsequently leaves the sample and
the value 0 otherwise; and (iii) the interactions between zi and the other covariates.
An F -test for the null that the coe cients of zi and its interactions with the other
covariates are jointly zero provides indication of whether attrition is likely to be a
problem. We perform the test and we conclude that we cannot reject the null that
all the relevant coe cients are jointly zero (F = 0.816, p = 0.63), suggesting that
the original estimates are unlikely to be biased by the attrition in our panel. Because
the third wave of the survey reached out to all the respondents from the first wave,
some individuals that were missing in wave 2 re-enter the sample in wave 3 of our
study. Even if we remove their observations from the third wave of the unbalanced
panel – e↵ectively treating such respondents as having left the study after the first
wave – we still find that attrition is unlikely to have any influence on our results.
After performing the same F -test as before we find that we still cannot reject the
null that all the relevant coe cients are jointly zero (F = 1.086, p = 0.37).
An alternative way of testing for the e↵ects of sample selection is to use the procedure
proposed by Nijman and Verbeek (1992). The procedure consists of using a Hausman
test to compare the coe cient estimates from the regression on the unbalanced
panel with the coe cient estimates from the regression on the balanced sub-panel.
Rejection of the null hypothesis, indicating the presence of significant di↵erences in
the coe cients, indicates that the e↵ects of sample selection cannot be dismissed. In
the first column of Table 4.6 we present the fixed e↵ects estimates from the sample of
respondents who were interviewed in all three waves (i.e., the balanced sub-panel). In
the second column of the table we present the estimates obtained with the unbalanced
6Alderman et al. (2001) also refer that similar conclusions exist for longitudinal surveys from
developed countries, pointing the reader to the results of the studies published in a special issue of
the Journal of Human Resources titled “Attrition in Longitudinal Surveys” (Spring issue, 1998).
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panel.7 We can see that for the main variables of interest the coe cient estimates are
similar, although the e↵ect of health expectations is not statistically significant at the
5% level on the balanced sub-panel estimation. There are no meaningful di↵erences
in the size of the coe cients on other variables (not presented on the table), but:
(i) the age variables are no longer statistically significant at the 5% level on the
balanced sub-panel (page = 0.135; pagesq = 0.053); and (ii) the physical health score
becomes statistically significant (p < 0.05). Based on the computed Hausman test
statistic ( 2 (15) = 20.47, p = 0.155) we do not reject the null hypothesis, suggesting
that bias from sample selection is unlikely to be a substantial problem in our data.
4.4.3 Autocorrelation
We might be concerned that the disturbances in equation 4.1 are serially correlated
across periods. If this is the case, the e ciency of our fixed e↵ects estimates is
negatively a↵ected and the inference based on those estimates is invalid. As pointed
out by Greene (2012, p. 903), serial correlation in the disturbances can arise when
we omit from our model relevant variables that are correlated across time. Serially
correlated disturbances might also arise if the dependent variable exhibits some sort
of inertia. This is particularly relevant in the context of our study because it is
conceivable that risk attitudes might have a fixed component around which they
fluctuate slowly over time. To test for serial correlation in the disturbances we use the
modified Durbin-Watson statistic proposed by Bhargava et al. (1982), and obtain the
value dp = 1.76. While the tables with 5% significance points presented by Bhargava
et al. (1982) do not cover the conditions of our particular case, the authors remark
(p. 536) that for samples with a large number of individuals researchers can follow a
simple rule: check if dp is less than two when testing for positive serial correlation,
or if 4  dp is less than two when testing for negative serial correlation.8
In Table 4.7 we present results from fixed e↵ects regression where the disturbances
in equation 4.1 are serially correlated, "i,t = ⇢"i,t 1 + ui,t, where ui,t is an i.i.d.
random variable, ui,t ⇠ N (0,  2u). The number of observations is smaller than in
7Because the Hausman test would not be valid with clustered standard errors, the results
we present in Table 4.6 do not account for such clustering. A comparison of the results for the
unbalanced panel with the equivalent results on Table 4.6 (column 2) shows that the accounting
for clustering results in very small changes on the standard errors, with clustered standard errors
being larger. However, our conclusions would hold even if the standard errors on Table 4.6 were as
large as the clustered standard errors.
8In fact, for sample sizes of n = 1000 the tables presented by Bhargava et al. (1982) (covering
T = 6 and T = 10) already indicate 5% significance points in excess of 1.95.
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Table 4.7: The effects of economic and health expectations on the
willingness to take risks, fixed effects estimates with serially
correlated disturbances
Economic expectations 0.125***
(0.030)
Health expectations 0.049
(0.040)
Observations 4177
R2 0.032
F -statistic 3.86
P(F -statistic) 0.000
Notes: The table reports coe cient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) from fixed
e↵ects regression with AR(1) disturbances. The dependent variable is the willingness to take
risks measured on a 5-point scale, with 1 indicating the lowest willingness to take risks, and 5
indicating the highest willingness to take risks. Economic and health expectations are measured
on 5-point scales, with 1 indicating the most negative expectations, and 5 indicating the most
positive expectations (see the text for details). Sociodemographic controls include variables for
age, education, marital status, physical and mental health, wealth, and life satisfaction. Asterisks
denote statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
the case of no serial correlation (see Table 4.4) because the data is transformed
to deal with the autoregressive component of the residuals. We find a statistically
significant relationship between economic expectations and the willingness to take
risks ( ˆ1 = 0.125, p < 0.01), with the estimate for the coe cient on economic
expectations being substantially larger than the one we obtain when we ignore the
issue of serial correlation ( ˆ1 = 0.059, in column 2 of Table 4.4). As for the coe cient
on health expectations, we find that the new estimate ( ˆ2 = 0.049) is smaller than
our original estimate ( ˆ2 = 0.062, in column 2 of Table 4.4) and no longer statistically
significant at the 5% level. The results suggest that if the disturbances are indeed
serially correlated, then our original findings may constitute a conservative estimate
of the importance of economic expectations, but may overestimate the importance
(and the statistical significance) of the e↵ects of health expectations.
Because our dataset contains a small number of time periods (T = 3), we have to
consider the possibility that the results of Table 4.7 build on a biased estimate of
the autoregressive coe cient ⇢. While our estimates indicate that ⇢ˆ = 0.143, it is
useful to investigate how the results would look like if ⇢ was to take on other values.
This provides a reasonable picture of how robust the results of Table 4.7 are to the
structure of the serial correlation. To this end we estimate our model for di↵erent
values on ⇢, and then compare the estimates obtained for the coe cients associated
with the expectations variables. In Figure 4.1 we present the coe cient estimates and
the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. For economic expectations the estimated
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Figure 4.1: Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for
the economic and health expectation variables, under different
values of ⇢.
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coe cient is always statistically significant at the 5% level, and the magnitude of
the coe cient varies little with ⇢. For health expectations we find considerably more
variation in the coe cient size as ⇢ varies, and that its statistical significance also
changes with ⇢. However, the coe cient would only be statistically significant at the
5% level for large absolute values of ⇢, 0.5 < |⇢| < 1, which are far from our baseline
estimate, ⇢ˆ = 0.143.
4.5 Discussion
4.5.1 Limitations
One potential limitation of our study is that we use survey-based measures of the
willingness to take risks, rather than incentive-compatible measures. We may question
whether such measures are a good tool to elicit risk attitudes, as they may be too
noisy even when respondents provide truthful answers. With respect to this, some
studies have successfully used survey-based measures to predict actual risky health
behavior (see, e.g., Szrek et al., 2012) and risk-taking behavior in contexts with
monetary consequences (see, e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011), thereby providing some
validity for their use. A related question is whether respondents provided truthful
answers when asked about their willingness to take risks. The data we use in this
study does not allow us to answer this question. The most we can learn from the
data is that respondents are consistent when they state their willingness to take
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risks: the Spearman rank correlation between the 5-point and 11-point measures of
risk attitudes is very high and statistically significant (rs = 0.932, p < 0.001).
Another limitation relates to how respondents may have interpreted our expectations
questions. When asked about their expectations for the economic environment in their
communities, some respondents may have interpreted “economic environment” as
referring to the number of businesses, others may have interpreted it as referring to the
income of the households, and yet others may have thought about unemployment or
a combination of these (or other) factors. While business activity, household income,
unemployment, and other economic indicators are usually correlated and linked to the
state of the economy, the di↵erent interpretations for “economic environment” may
potentially add noise to our measure of economic expectations. This is also a concern
for the health expectations question. When asked about their expectations for their
own health, some respondents may have interpreted it as referring to their physical
health, their mental health, or a combination of both. The data, however, shows a
statistically significant Spearman rank correlation between health expectations in
wave t and the PCS12 scores in wave t+1 (rs = 0.098, p < 0.001), but no evidence of
a statistically significant Spearman rank correlation between health expectations in
wave t and the MCS12 scores in wave t+ 1 (rs =  0.0004, p = 0.982). This suggests
respondents may have mostly interpreted the question in terms of their own physical
health.
The small number of periods in our dataset limits our ability to properly investigate
the issue of serially correlated disturbances. We may detect (and wrongly correct
for) serial correlation where there is none, or if serial correlation is indeed present we
may obtain poor estimates for the process governing it, and fail to properly correct
its e↵ects. Our conclusions about the role of economic expectations are not a↵ected
by this issue, as we always find a statistically significant e↵ect regardless of whether
serial correlation is indeed present, and regardless of what it might be like. For health
expectations, however, this is not the case. Our results suggest the presence (and
nature) of serially correlated disturbances may substantially change our conclusions,
and as such the limitations of our data become important.
One final limitation of our study relates to the issue of causality. Because we do
not have clearly identified exogenous variations in the expectations variables, we
cannot rule out that it is the variation in the willingness to take risks that drives the
variation in the economic and health expectations. This is particularly relevant for
the health expectations, because those who rate themselves as being more willing to
take risks may indeed engage in unhealthy risky behavior more frequently, and they
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may understand that such behavior is likely to be detrimental to their future health.
The direction of causality is perhaps less controversial with respect to economic
expectations. The economic environment of the communities where we conducted
our interviews is influenced by factors that are, to a large extent, exogenous from the
perspective of our respondents. Factors such as political and economic conditions
at the national level, and price developments in international markets are likely to
directly a↵ect the economic conditions of the communities where the respondents
live. To the extent that our respondents understand such relationships, some of the
variation observed in economic expectations is probably exogenous. Furthermore,
it is unlikely that the individual actions and choices of our respondents have an
appreciable e↵ect in the economic environment of their communities. Respondents
may therefore think that their willingness to take risks does not a↵ect the economic
outlook for their communities.
4.5.2 Policy implications
Attitudes towards risk play a key role in many choices that individuals make, such as
when deciding whether or not to pursue a risky recreational activity, whether or not
to open a business, or whether or not to invest in a risky asset. While expectations
may influence such decisions directly, our results suggest that expectations may also
influence such decisions by shaping attitudes towards risk. The presence of such
mechanism has important policy implications.
Our results suggest that when people anticipate good economic conditions they
become more willing to take risks. During an expansion, economic risk taking then
increases in response to better expected returns but also in response to the shift in
expectations. For individuals like those in our sample, who face a paucity of jobs
and who often turn to small entrepreneurial ventures to make a living, this might
result in excess entry and, subsequently, in higher rates of business failure. During
a contraction, economic risk taking then decreases in response to worse expected
returns but also in response to the shift in expectations. For individuals like those in
our sample, this might stifle their entrepreneurial activity more than if risk attitudes
had remained unchanged, compounding on the negative e↵ects of job destruction
that take place in a downturn.
Conditional on the external validity of our study, the results related to economic
expectations may also provide a new perspective of investor behavior and contribute
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to improve our understanding of asset bubbles. Our study suggests that positive
information about the economy may feed into investor behavior not only by raising
expected returns, but also by increasing the willingness to take risks. This points to
the possibility that asset prices are partially driven by a self-reinforcing mechanism.
During an economic expansion investors bid up asset prices because of better expected
returns, but do it to a greater extent than if risks attitudes had remained unchanged.
Asset prices increases may themselves be perceived as additional positive information
about the economy, further contributing to increase the investors’ willingness to
take risks, and consequently they exert additional upwards pressure on asset prices.
During an economic contraction the mechanism works in the opposite direction,
and acts to exert an additional downwards pressure on asset prices that would not
exist had risk attitudes remained unchanged. Asset boom and bust cycles may
thus be partly driven by a rational response of investors to shifts in risk attitudes
caused by good or bad economic news. This question is relevant because large swings
in asset prices are often an important source of macroeconomic fluctuations, and
there is considerable debate about whether monetary policy should respond to such
movements in asset prices (see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 2001; Leduc and Natal,
2016; Mishkin, 2017). The presence of a mechanism such as the one suggested by our
results would provide a rationale for policy interventions aimed at shaping investors’
expectations.
To a lesser extent, our results suggest that improving the health expectations of
individuals may also increase their willingness to take risks. This finding is relevant
for the discussion of policy interventions in many Sub-Saharan African countries, as
they sometimes face public health challenges and economic challenges simultaneously.
Public health interventions which improve health conditions and health expectations
may also contribute to increase the willingness to take risks in the population, and
contribute to encourage entrepreneurial risk taking. Because individuals in those
countries often face a paucity of jobs and turn to small business ownership to make a
living, the increase in entrepreneurial activity potentially spurred by the improvement
in health expectations is something that should not be overlooked by policymakers
when deciding about public health interventions.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we used data from a longitudinal survey conducted in the Tshwane
Municipality, South Africa, to study how economic and health expectations relate to
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a measure of willingness to take risks. We found economic expectations significantly
predict the willingness to take risks: individuals who have better expectations for
the economic environment of their community report a higher willingness to take
risks. The evidence regarding the relationship between health expectations and
the willingness to take risks is less conclusive. In our main regressions, we found
that better health expectations significantly predict our 5-point measure of risk
attitudes: individuals with better expectations for their own health status report a
higher willingness to take risks. However, we found that the result does not hold
in a regression that uses a 10-point measure of risk attitudes as dependent variable
(available for a sub-sample of observations), nor in a series of robustness checks.
The results highlight an indirect channel through which economic expectations may
influence decision making under risk, as risk attitudes have been shown to predict risk
taking behavior in many contexts (see, e.g., Hanoch et al., 2006; Szrek et al., 2012).
However, in our study we do not directly examine whether expectations significantly
predict decision making under risk, and a potential next step is to examine this issue
using either data from people’s decisions in everyday life contexts where risk plays a
role, or data from incentive-compatible measures of risk attitudes.
As highlighted in Section 4.2, our study compares a measure of risk attitudes
in general with measures of expectations in two specific domains, and in some
circumstances this may limit our ability to detect a relationship between expectations
and risk attitudes. Thus, future research may also re-examine the issues addressed
in our study using domain-specific measures of expectations and domain-specific
measures of the willingness to take risks. Furthermore, a study with domain-specific
measures could also allow us to understand whether our results reflect a relationship
between expectations and risk attitudes that, although detectable with a measure of
risk attitudes in general, is domain specific, or whether the expectations exhibit a
relationship with risk attitudes in general.
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Table A.1: The effects of economic and health expectations on the
willingness to take risks (full regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic expectations 0.062*** 0.059** 0.059** 0.108***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.033)
Health expectations 0.070** 0.062** 0.060* 0.043
(0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.042)
Age 0.117** 0.120** 0.116
(0.059) (0.059) (0.139)
Age squared -0.001** -0.001** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
PCS12 score 0.005 0.001 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
MCS12 score -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Life satisfaction 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Marital status 0.217*** 0.256*** 0.313**
(0.079) (0.092) (0.135)
Primary schooling completed 0.137 0.165 0.072
(0.273) (0.339) (0.379)
Some secondary schooling -0.049 -0.026 0.545
(0.379) (0.404) (0.605)
Secondary schooling completed 0.005 0.006 0.941
(0.414) (0.440) (0.660)
Above secondary schooling 0.231 0.225 1.577**
(0.446) (0.472) (0.758)
Wealth index 0.005 0.010 0.048
(0.023) (0.028) (0.044)
Wave 2 dummy 0.281*** 0.190 0.132
(0.042) (0.128) (0.131)
Wave 3 dummy 0.582*** 0.415** 0.382** 0.234**
(0.046) (0.186) (0.188) (0.119)
(continues)
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Table A.1: The effects of economic and health expectations on the
willingness to take risks (full regressions, continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Business owner 0.088
(0.777)
Business owner x Economic ex-
pectations
-0.002
(0.049)
Business owner x Health expec-
tations
-0.009
(0.057)
Business owner x Age -0.012
(0.025)
Business owner x Age squared 0.000
(0.000)
Business owner x PCS12 score 0.012*
(0.006)
Business owner x MCS12 score -0.005
(0.005)
Business owner x Life satisfaction -0.002
(0.002)
Business owner x Marital status -0.106
(0.124)
Business owner x Primary school-
ing completed
-0.096
(0.318)
Business owner x Some secondary
schooling
-0.015
(0.254)
Business owner x Secondary
schooling completed
0.062
(0.281)
Business owner x Above sec-
ondary schooling
0.097
(0.314)
Business owner x Wealth index -0.018
(0.041)
Business owner x Wave 2 dummy 0.151
(0.098)
Business owner x Wave 3 dummy 0.101
(0.113)
(continues)
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Table A.1: The effects of economic and health expectations on the
willingness to take risks (full regressions, continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relocated -2.773
(5.231)
Relocated x Economic expect. 0.032
(0.153)
Relocated x Health expect. 0.113
(0.200)
Relocated x Age 0.328*
(0.192)
Relocated x Age squared -0.004
(0.002)
Relocated x PCS12 score -0.016
(0.032)
Relocated x MCS12 score -0.017
(0.020)
Relocated x Life satisfaction 0.002
(0.007)
Relocated x Marital status -0.302
(0.425)
Relocated x Primary schooling
completed
–
–
Relocated x Some secondary
schooling
-1.984***
(0.676)
Relocated x Secondary schooling
completed
-2.454***
(0.701)
Relocated x Above secondary
schooling
-1.498*
(0.774)
Relocated x Wealth index 0.075
(0.102)
Relocated x Wave 3 dummy -0.599**
(0.280)
Constant 2.479*** -1.031 -1.005 -0.947
(0.134) (2.122) (2.130) (4.348)
Observations 6857 6857 6857 4225
R2 0.044 0.051 0.055 0.055
F -statistic 41.22 13.50 7.24 4.55
P(F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports coe cient estimates and clustered standard errors (in parentheses) from
fixed e↵ects regressions. The dependent variable is the willingness to take risks measured on a
5-point scale, with 1 indicating the lowest willingness to take risks, and 5 indicating the highest
willingness to take risks. Economic and health expectations are measured on 5-point scales, with 1
indicating the most negative expectations, and 5 indicating the most positive expectations (see the
text for details). In regression (4) the coe cient on the interaction between the relocation dummy
and the dummy that indicates completion of primary schooling cannot be estimated because the
number of observations is insu cient. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
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Table A.2: The effects of economic and health expectations on the
willingness to take risks, pooled OLS and ordered logit estimates
Pooled OLS Pooled ordinal logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic expectations 0.148*** 0.116*** 1.195*** 1.156***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.028)
Health expectations 0.237*** 0.122*** 1.314*** 1.159***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.037) (0.033)
Age 0.025*** 1.036***
(0.007) (0.010)
Age squared -0.000*** 0.999***
(0.000) (0.000)
PCS12 score 0.017*** 1.022***
(0.003) (0.003)
MCS12 score 0.004** 1.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Life satisfaction 0 1.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Marital status 0.098** 1.117**
(0.043) (0.059)
Primary education completed -0.006 0.991
(0.107) (0.136)
Some secondary education 0.103 1.117
(0.067) (0.093)
Secundary education completed 0.205** 1.282**
(0.079) (0.127)
Above secondary education 0.401*** 1.509***
(0.085) (0.158)
Wealth index 0.024* 1.026
(0.014) (0.018)
Wave 2 dummy 0.336*** 0.287*** 1.445*** 1.366***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.070) (0.070)
Wave 3 dummy 0.647*** 0.577*** 2.105*** 1.978***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.113) (0.113)
Constant 1.504*** 0.627** 2.327*** 8.091***
(0.113) (0.264) (0.320) (2.722)
Observations 6857 6857 6857 6857
R2 0.052 0.122
F -statistic 91.96 69.40
P(F -statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald  2 – – 320.02 710.23
P(Wald  2) – – 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports coe cient estimates and clustered standard errors (in parentheses) from
pooled OLS (columns 1 and 2) and pooled ordered logit (columns 3 and 4) regressions. The
dependent variable is the willingness to take risks measured on a 5-point scale, with 1 indicating the
lowest willingness to take risks, and 5 indicating the highest willingness to take risks. Economic and
health expectations are measured on 5-point scales, with 1 indicating the most negative expectations,
and 5 indicating the most positive expectations (see the text for details). Sociodemographic controls
include variables for age, education, marital status, physical and mental health, wealth, and life
satisfaction. Asterisks denote statistical significance: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
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